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Published: 20 October 2008

Created: 20 October 2008

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THE BHAGAVAD GITA

A TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY BY NATARAJA GURU

BHAGAVAD GITA INTRODUCTION

• CHAPTER 1
• CHAPTER 2
• CHAPTER 3
• CHAPTER 4
• CHAPTER 5
• CHAPTER 6
• CHAPTER 7
• CHAPTER 8
• CHAPTER 9
• CHAPTER 10
• CHAPTER 11
• CHAPTER 12
• CHAPTER 13
• CHAPTER 14
• CHAPTER 15
• CHAPTER 16
• CHAPTER 17
• CHAPTER 18

Details

Written by Patrick Misson

Parent Category: Content

Published: 20 October 2008

Created: 20 October 2008

Last Updated: 01 July 2015

Hits: 29926

71

THE BHAGAVAD GITA

CHAPTER 1

THE DIALECTICAL CONFLICT OF ARJUNA

Arjuna-Vishada-Yoga

Scant respect has been paid by commentators like Sankara and
others to this chapter. Translators and others interested in
the Gita teaching have tended to consider this chapter even
as superfluous. As a matter of fact this chapter deserves to
be treated at least on a par with the rest of the chapters
dealing with the Science of the Absolute.

Before anything subtle or profound can be taught, the
purvapaksha or the anterior position of the sceptic in regard
to such a teaching has to be determined with clarity. Vyasa
accomplishes this task with great attention to detail in this
chapter. This chapter may be said to contain the key to the
proper understanding of the teaching in the rest of the book.
Arjuna is not a mere coward on the battlefield. His confusion
is of a representative character. As described in its
three stages of Verse 21, Verses 29 and 30, and Verse 47 in
this chapter, and read together with its last stage in Chapter
ii, 9, no room is left to doubt its fully contemplative
character. Such a term alone would justify the term "Yoga"
(unitive way) as applied to this chapter.

When Arjuna tells Krishna again at the very end of the
Gita (xviii, 73) that he is willing to act on Krishna's advice
and, when he is described in the very last verse of the Gita
as holding his bow and arrow normally again, the secret
indications belonging to this chapter, serving to demarcate
the various stages of the discussion of Yoga (as it is meant
to be understood in the Gita) may be said to have reached
their natural culmination.

Arjuna's confusion starts with his words: "0 Achyuta, stop
my chariot right in the middle between the two armies", (i,
21). We know how impossible it is to enter the no-man's-
land between two armies as the arrows fly (as stated in i,
20). The Gita itself, by admitting such a possibility, gains,
from this point onwards, a revised status as being primarily
concerned

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with contemplation rather than with the actual events of the
battlefield. Arjuna's condition worsens in i, 29-30 when he
sees friends not only on his side but on the side that faces
him. He is a thoroughly confused man there, unable even
to hold up his bow, Gandiva. He recovers some sort of
firmness or certitude of outlook by the end of the chapter,
when he sits down, throwing away his bow and arrow. By
ii, 9, he has finished philosophizing on the situation as ably
perhaps as Krishna himself is able to do. The latter is only
able, for the time being, to smile at Arjuna and mock him
in the name of honour, etc. To be stated in its
completeness, Krishna's answer needs all the remaining
chapters. Even then, it is not easy to say clearly where
Arjuna was wrong in his reasons, so elaborately stated in
this chapter and more philosophically in the next. He
prefers renunciation to fighting and does not care for the
benefits that fighting might bring him. Detachment,
relinquishment or renunciation are ways of life praised and
even directly and indirectly recommended in the last
chapter of the Gita.

Such being the case, to say in what exactly Arjuna's
inconsistency (as referred to by Krishna when he says,
"You speak words of wisdom too" - ii, 11) lies, is not so
easy a matter to locate or fix, as some persons imagine it to
be. Arjuna is more than a mere fighter. He has the makings
of a philosopher or even a dialectician, as the words
attributed to him in ii, 5-8 amply reveal. These verses are
in the special metre of the sacred scriptures which is a
further indication to the reader that they have to be taken
seriously as part of the contribution to contemplative
thought, as intended by the author.

Further, Arjuna can be considered as a representative
sceptic of his age, when India was filled with warring
tribes, clans or even "castes", as understood in those days,
in a sense somewhat different from the present. A close
examination of Arjuna's objections to war in general
reveals that they belong more to the world of ancestors
than to the world of the Devas or Shining Gods of the
Vedic context. His brother, Bhima, is a typical
representative of the prehistoric stalwart, one rough and
uncouth and having a great appetite. This natural man is
innocent of the refinements of the Vedic ritualistic way of
life which may be imagined to have been introduced into
India by that time. Vedism represented the other, the
Devayana (way of the Shining Gods). The prehistoric
Vrishnis and other clans of India were possibly the last
remnants

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of the ancestor-worshipping Pitriyanis (those following the
way of the Fathers), of pre-Aryan or prehistoric India,
possibly of the stratum of the Mohenjo-Daro Indus Valley
civilization. Although these matters are still highly
speculative, all we want to stress here for the
understanding of the Gita properly is that at least two
distinct sets of values were involved in the revaluation of
spirituality in India that took place at the time of the
Mahabharata war. Bhishma, the respected patriarch of the
Mahabharata war, and Drona, the teacher of archery and
possibly of the Vedas too, may be said to represent the two
types in question. This is not an original suggestion, but
one that has received sufficient recognition in India itself
as we see from the composition called the Gita Dhyana to
which we have referred in the general introduction.
Also in our introduction, we have made reference to the
literary devices employed by Vyasa in order to fit the
actualities of the war as described in the epic of the
Mahabharata into the purer requirements of a
contemplative work.

Three curtains were mentioned before the stage becomes
properly set for the contemplative dialogue (samvada) to
begin. The scene in which Samjaya reports to Dhritarashtra
is the first drop curtain with which this chapter begins.
This is raised once preliminarily between the first and
second half of Verse 21, to be dropped soon at the end of
Verse 23 and to be raised more properly in Verse 28. The
second curtain is seen with Krishna as a mere charioteer to
Arjuna before being recognized as a Guru by Arjuna,
which event takes place only after the proper request of
Arjuna for instruction in ii, 7 and actually only with xi, 11.
There we can see the third curtain or device of Vyasa,
where Krishna plays the role of the Guru and Arjuna
listens to Krishna and sometimes questions him as a
disciple. Again, within the dialogue itself we have to
separate the purva-paksha (anterior opinion) from the
siddhanta (final doctrine) of the Guru. Thus, three different
literary devices have to be kept in mind and also the
separation of the disciple's mistaken prior notions from the
finalized teaching of the Guru, before the reader can arrive
at the proper teaching or message of the Gita. Over and
above all these, each of the eighteen chapters must be
treated as a separate discussion with its own central idea of
unity, its own frame of reference and exact terminology.
The unity of this particular chapter devolves round the
need for stating clearly the position of the anterior sceptic
for the teaching of the Gita.

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1
dharmakshetre kurukshetre
sarnaveta yuyutsavah
mamakah pandavash chai'va
kim akurvata samjaya

Dhritarashtra said:
In the righteousness-field, the field of Kurus, gathered
together, intent on battle, what did my people and also the
sons of Pandu do, 0 Samjaya?

Note that the literary device of employing Dhritarashtra
speaking to Samjaya belongs to the front curtain. He is the
"holder of the kingdom "who is to decide whether he is to
maintain the status quo or let things happen or shape
themselves according to truth or justice. In this case he is a
conservative who sticks obstinately to fixed custom. He
refuses to allow any revaluation or readjustment to take
place. To that extent he is a blind statesman. His party, led
by Duryodhana (see Verse 2), are also to be considered
diehards who will not let the old order change to give place
to the new. The latter is therefore aptly compared to a
whirlpool in the Gita-Dhyana (see Appendix).
Krishna's way of thinking or his spirituality has its
greatest obstruction in Duryodhana, just as Rama, in the
Ramayana, has his in Ravana. Duryodhana goes to heaven
in the end, but heaven is not the ideal of the absolutist
spirituality of Krishna. Going to heaven is not a credit as far
as the Gita is concerned. The Gita stands for pure
Absolutism - i.e. for no benefits or fruits of action, whether
here or hereafter, thus conforming to the requirements
tacitly understood within the discipline of the Vedanta (as
for example, found in Sankara's "Vivekachudamani", v. 19:
"non-attachment to benefits of this world or the world to
come ").

This should be noted together with fact that Duryodhana,
the chief of the army of Dhritarashtra, approached Drona,
who is a Guru of an indifferent sort, a priest for both the
Pandas and the Kauravas, and not only a teacher of
archery, but an inculcator of relativist notions including
Vedic ritualism. Arjuna himself has evidently been
influenced by the teaching, either of Drona, or at least of
Bhishma, the other Guru here, as can be seen from his
arguments in this chapter, where, in Verse 42, he speaks of
naraka (hell). Arjuna thus speaks of

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relativist forms of spirituality, though not equally
consciously of Vedic heavenly values.

The reader has to be clear in his own mind about the
nature of the contending parties so that, both historically,
and in the context of righteousness, he can determine
which side here deserves his support - otherwise, even as a
purana or legend, the Gita loses its point, and it will fail to
make him any wiser than he was before he read it. Hence
these indications, though seemingly elaborate, become
necessary.

Dharmakshetre kurukshetre: righteousness-field of
Kurus. Why these apparently redundant epithets? This is
characteristic of the style of the Gita throughout. Being
part of a purana, an epic-legend or saga, it has to be correct
in historical details and, at the same time, it has to fulfill the
need for guiding people in the appreciation of ethical and
spiritual values.

Kurukshetra is the historical field of battle of the
Kauravas, and is also to be understood simultaneously as a
place where the revaluation of ethical and spiritual values
is going to take place.

The word dharma in dharmakshetra comes from the
word "to bear "or "to support ". Each man, besides being
a man pure and simple, comes with his own notions of
natural conduct, by which he chooses between right and
wrong courses of action. This second moral person is
superimposed on the basic animal man. Or, in other words,
the man is the wielder of his notion of right action when
such notions of right action are revalued. That is the
dharmakshetra referred to here. We have to be prepared
for other double epithets or instructions throughout the
Gita textbook. It is one of the peculiarities of the style of
the work, referred to in the introduction (page 59). We
have for example, "think of Me, also fight "(viii, 7) and
"thinking of Me and repeating (Aum) "(viii, 13).

Mamakah: my people. This underlines the relative-
mindedness of King Dhritarashtra himself, who could have
been impartial or neutral as the custodian of all the people,
and his taking of sides here is the beginning of the trouble.
It divides the people in two, producing a duality which is
responsible for the battle itself.

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2
samjaya uvacha:
drishtva tu pandavanikam
vyudham duryodhanas tada
acharyam upasamgamyaraja
vachanam abravit

Samjaya said:
On seeing the army of the Pandavas in (battle) array, Prince Duryodhana, having approached his teacher, then gave utterance to the following speech:

The fact that Duryodhana's name itself signifies "difficult
to fight,"indicates the conservative diehard. He is therefore
the active agent of Dhritarashtra who is himself not very
active, or debarred by blindness from activity. Dhritarashtra
is also blind to truth, and in his talk to Samjaya is
theoretically interested in what is happening. The first
degree of activity is, therefore, attained in Duryodhana, who is
in charge of operations. We see how the epic qualities thus
begin to be unravelled in the Gita.

Acharyam upasamgamya: "having approached his teacher".
There are three who enjoy the rank of spiritual
teachers or acharyas on the side of the Kauravas, namely
Drona, Bhishma, and Kripa. The last is related to Drona
himself as brother-in-law, and both probably belong to the
Vedic context. On the other hand, Bhima is a brahmachari
or strict bachelor who is a patriarch (pitamaha) rather than a
priest. His virtues are many, including continence, wisdom,
bravery, fidelity to his word, etc. He is a model of
spirituality equally important beside Drona and given equal
status in the Gita Dhyana where these two are considered as
constituting the two banks of the "battle-river" (rananadi),
which is the river of dialectical revaluation of spirituality in
terms of the absolutism of Krishna-paramatma, who is there
mentioned as the ferry-man (kaivartaka) who is capable of
ferrying the devotees across the stream of rapids and
whirlpools, rocks, crocodiles and billows representing the
various impediments in the relativist world (samsara). The
absolutist standpoint represents the boat wherein the Guru is
the Ferryman.

On the Pandava's side, therefore, there is one Guru and one
only, who teaches Brahmavidya, the Science of the
Absolute, as against many partial gurus and numerous
followers of different kinds on the side of the Kauravas, all
of whom could be classified under two major heads - those
who stand for Vedic Devayana values, and those who stand
for ancestral Pitriyana values, which may be supposed to
have been known in India before the advent of the Aryans;
Bhishma representing the latter and Drona being typical of
the former.

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3
pasyai 'tam panduputranam
acharya mahatim chamum
vyudham drupadaputrena
tava sishyena dhimata

0 Teacher, look at this grand army of the sons of Pandu,
marshaled by your talented pupil, the son of Drupada.

The son of Drupada is Dhrishtadyumna. He is considered
as the arch-enemy of the Kauravas, which is fairly clear
from the fact that he was killed at the hands of
Ashvatthaman the son of Drona, although Drona was his
teacher. Note how pointed reference is made to
Dhrishtadyumna, son of Drupada as a disciple of Drona,
although all the Pandavas have been tutored in archery by
Drona, including more important disciples like Arjuna and
Dharmaputra who are omitted. The reason for omission is
probably that the latter represent righteousness in keeping
with the absolutist teaching of Krishna, and so they are less
capable of actual rancour which is a desirable quality on the
battlefield.

Dhimata - talented: Should be construed more as sagacious
organizing intelligence rather than as wisdom in the
philosophical sense.

4
atra sura maheshvasa
bhimarjunasama yudhi
yuyudhano viratas cha
drupadas cha maharathah

Here are heroes, mighty archers, equal in battle to Bhima
and Arjuna, Yuyodhana, Virata and Drupada of the great
chariot.

5
dhrishtaketus chekitanah
kasirajas cha viryavan
purujit kuntibhojas cha
saibyas cha narapumgavah

Dhrishtaketu, Chekitana the valiant King of Kasi, Purujit
and Kuntibhoja, and that bull among men, Saibya.

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6
yudhamanyus cha virkranta
uttamaujas cha viryavan
saubhadro draupadeyas cha
sarva eva maharathah

The heroic Yudhamanyu and the brave Uttamaujas; the son
of Subhadra and the sons of Draupadi, all of great chariots.

Bhima: Yudhishthira's Commander-in-Chief, elder brother
of Arjuna.
Arjuna: Pandava hero, central figure in the Gita and
representative sceptic or purva pakshin.
Yuyodhana (also called Satyaki): Krishna's charioteer
when the latter is playing the usual part of historical warrior
in the epic.
Virata: a prince who sheltered the Pandavas.
Drupada: father of Draupadi, wife of the Pandavas.
Dhrishtaketu. King of the Chedis.
Chekitana: warrior in the Pandava army.
Kasi-Raja: King of Benares.
Purujit: A king and brother of Kuntibhoja.
Kuntibhoja: brother of Purujit.
Saibya: King of the Shibis.
Yudhamanyu: a warrior.
Uttamaujas: One of great valour.
Saubhadrah: son of Arjuna and his wife Subhadra.
Draupadeya: of the line of Drupada.

Besides names of important persons, epithets will occur
throughout the Gita such as "lion of men" etc. They are
necessary to give the text the heroic setting and flavour
belonging to a saga. They should not be mixed up with the
clear spiritual message of the Gita. The clear teaching must
be filtered out free from all such incidental dross belonging
to the epic. An epithet like maharatha (one having a great
chariot) denotes some military rank, like that of a field-
marshal.

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7
asmakam tu visishta ye
tan nibodha dvijottama
nayaka nama sainyasya
samjnartham tan bravimi te

But know who are the most distinguished among us, 0 best
of the twice-born, the leaders of my army; these I tell you,
for you to recognize by name.

After enumerating some of the leaders of the opposite
army in which, it should be noted, there are glaring
omissions, especially of Yudhishthira (eldest of the
Pandavas, probably because of his reputation for virtue.
Duryodhana, who is here speaking to Drona, now turns his
attention to his own army and indicates the purpose of such
an enumeration. This enumeration, according to him, is not
without importance. Like Dhritarashtra in Verse 1, he is still
speaking from the relativist standpoint. He insists on talking
of "our side" (asmakam). The evils of war as they might
affect humanity as a whole are carefully excluded, till
Arjuna's confusion (vishada) opens the question from a
non-relativist point of view.

The word asmakam, meaning "among us, our side", is
therefore underlined by the author Vyasa as the first word
in this verse. That Vyasa intends explicitly to refer to the
two contending parties, is sufficiently evident from the
word samjnartham (recognition by name) put in the mouth
of Duryodhana here. The list of names is not meant to be
merely a catalogue of warriors to be treated indifferently.
The names are meant to be understood as belonging either
to the blast or counter-blast aspects of the situation, which
is to be examined as it unravels itself, both as a battle of
events and as a progressive revaluation of dharma (right
conduct) or spiritual values in the chapters that follow.

Samjna really means more than name or class. It has an
element of further recognition as coming under a distinct
category. What Vyasa wants to accomplish here is quite
evident. He wants the reader of the Gita to avoid confusing
the actual with the spiritual values implied. The literary
device in the mind of the author thus comes into evidence
quite deliberately in the end of the last line. This is most
vital for the reader to see.

80

8
bhavan bhishmas cha karnas cha
kripas cha samitimjayah
asvatthama vikarnas cha
saumadattis tathai 'va cha

You and Bhishma, and Karna, and also Kripa, the victor in
war, Ashvatthaman and Vikarna and also the son of
Somadatta;

Bhavan: thyself, i.e. Drona, a teacher of the Vedic context
who also taught archery.
Bhishma: a patriarch reputed for his celibacy and high
purity of life; much respected by all.
Karna: Born of the Sun-god and Kunti, mother of the
Pandavas when she was still young. He was a great fighter
and archer, invincible because of an armour given by the
Sun-god himself
Kripa: brother of Kripi, the wife of Drona, but sympathetic
to the Pandavas.
Ashvatthaman: son of Drona by Kripi; subject of a false
alarm raised about him in order to distract Drona and
demoralize him by saying that Ashvatthaman was dead, when
it was only a toy elephant of that name which was
destroyed.
Vikarna: a ruthless fighter like Ashvatthaman.
Saumadatti: son of Somadatta, King of the Bahikas.

Note that Bhishma is named only after Drona, who is very
little connected by lineage with Bhishma, or indeed with
either of the contending parties. Drona is only the teacher of
archery, but he is given first place. This must be because
the battle-issue involving spiritual values is of interest to
Drona as a dvijottama (a twice-born invested with the
sacred thread). Again, in Verse 25, Krishna himself, as the
charioteer, makes pointed reference to Drona and Bhishma
as against all the rest of the army, not excluding even kings.

It is clear that the issue involves spiritual factors personified
by these two characters, and that the interests of clashing
kings are but incidental to the situation which is gradually
being developed. This development finally reaches a focal
point with the beginning of the dialogue (samvada) proper
(from ii, 10 onwards). The dialogue constitutes the core of
the Gita. In the Gita-Dhyana the teaching is referred to as a
"perfume" or gandha of the lotus flower, to be enjoyed by
the good men of the world who seek spiritual values. The
historical episodes contained in the Mahabharata are treated
as extraneous or gross, being described as the petals and
anthers of the lotus. The perfume or the song of wisdom or
song of dialectics is the supreme value for the good man.
That is the fragrance which comes as a rhapsody in this
song or Gita.

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9
anye cha bahavah sura
madarthe tyaktajivita
nanasastra praharanah
sarve yuddhavisdradah

And many other heroes who are willing to die for me, who
have various missiles and weapons, and all skilled in
warfare.

It should be understood that "willing to die for me"
shows the defence of precious values dear to human beings.
Fanatics will die for their faith in a holy war. Faith becomes
at least as precious as life. Duryodhana here represents a
life-value connected with kingship and power in this world.
This is held precious by his followers. But, of course,
however exalted such a value might be, it is still in the
relativist plane. It might bring them heaven as recompense
in the hereafter, as the warriors of Scandinavian mythology
were carried triumphantly to Valhalla by powerful female
deities called Valkyries. Duryodhana himself is supposed to
have won this reward. This epithet "willing to die for me"
is, therefore, to fix one generic character common to all the
Kauravas. All are affiliated to a central relativist value
personified in their king, Duryodhana.

Their other qualifications are those which are attributes
of the workaday world (vyavaharika). They carry diverse
weapons and are skilled in warfare. Their capability to lay
down their lives for the still relativist value of kingship is
therefore the only spiritual factor to their credit.

10
aparyaptam tad asmakam
balam bhishmabhirakshitam
paryaptam tv idam etesham
balam bhimabhirakshitam

This army of ours which is under the care of Bhishma is
insufficient but that army of theirs which is under the care
of Bhima is adequate.

Duryodhana himself has an inkling of the poverty of this
type of spirituality here represented in the Kaurava side,
when he feels diffident about the army led by Bhishma.
This is the first supreme example of the special style found
so often

82

in the Gita. In the first place there is a symmetry to be seen
in the construction of the verse. Bhima (the Strong) and
Bhishma (the Terrible) are evidently brought in to he
treated as counterparts of a situation in the world of
actuality from which the subtler dialectics of the later
theoretical arguments are to have their natural springboard.

Aparyaptam: has been differently construed by Sridhara
and Anandagiri; by Sridhara as meaning "insufficient" and
by Anandagiri as "unlimited". Perhaps an equilibrium of
qualitative and quantitative elements is purposely intended
by the author here. The usual or first meaning, "insufficient"
or "unequal to the task" suits the sense here definitely,
especially if we note that, as a relativist, as Duryodhana is
intended to be here, his diffidence is understandable in the
same way as the nimittani-cha-pashyami (I see omens) of
Arjuna is understandable (in Verse 31). Diffidence or
strange omens have to be set off one against the other in the
revaluation of relativism in absolutist terms which is going
to take place as the chapters proceed. Both are forms of
doubt - one here and now, and the other with an element of
the hereafter added on. Arjuna, being a purva-pakshin
(anterior critic) of the contemplative context, his doubt is
superior to that of Duryodhana, because it includes iha and
para, the "here" and the "hereafter"; while Duryodhana's
doubt is confined to the "here" only.

"That army of ours" and "this army of theirs" are
again put in a delicate dialectical relationship.

"That…ours" and "this…theirs" - to the extent that
reciprocity is suggested, to that extent Duryodhana is to be
credited a good man. The interchange of "that" for "this"
again introduces the special style of the Gita upon which
we lay emphasis because it is in keeping with the full
subtle interplay of dialectical values for which this is only
a preparation. This is by no means a matter of grammatical
quibbling. Note that, except for small suffixes or words
like a and tu and idam, there is no difference at all between
the two limbs of this verse, and this perfect symmetry can
be no accident and must have been consciously, intentionally
brought in by the author for the reasons we have stated.

83

11
ayaneshu cha sarveshu
yathabhagam avasthitah
bhishmam eva 'bhirakshantu
bhavantah sarva eva hi

And let all of you, standing in your respective positions
at the entrance to every formation, keep guard even on
Bhishma.

On the side of the Kauravas this verse makes it clear that the protection of the spirituality personified in Bhishma is their dearest collective value as far as they could understand.
That is why he is asked to be protected, although all others (Drona for example) might deserve equal protection. It should be further noticed that this verse shows many plurals employed, numerous ranks and files, numerous divisions, numerous generals. The word sarva (all, implying many) occurs twice. This is evidently to emphasize the fact that unitive command is lacking, as contrasted with the other army, as we shall notice presently. Quantitative and numerical factors prevail here. Of course there is Bhishma as a central figure, but he is too old to take any initiative of a unitive pattern. It is he who needs personal protection, rather than himself leading others. As contrasted with the "vertical" or orderly unitive organization of the Pandava army, we find here among the Kauravas a "horizontal" amorphous or mass situation prevailing.

The difference suggested here will become evident as we proceed.

12
tasya samjanayan harsham
kuruvriddlhah pitamahah
simhanadam vinadyo 'chchaih
sankham dadhmau pratapavan

So as to cheer him, the mighty old Kuru patriarch roared
loudly like a lion and blew a conch.

Sanyanayan harsham: to generate joy (in him). What is
the nature of the joy referred to here? The diffidence
mentioned in Verse 10 becomes here explicit.

Duryodhana's premonitions of defeat there are meant to be
banished by the blowing of the conch-shell by Bhishma
who, though very old, understands why Duryodhana is
diffident. He blows his conch as if to say "I represent a
spiritual value which is the highest as understood by all of
us till now". It contains elements of absolutism in the
comparatively relativist field in which he is a patriarch and
chief among men, but still limited to the human context at
its best. His conch-sound is of the nature

84

of a battle-cry. Note by contrast that an epithet suggesting
divinity (divyau) is applied to the conches of Krishna and
Arjuna in Verse 14. Bhishma's dominant position among his
own people could be compared to that of Moses with his
chosen people, beside Jesus who was the Light of the World.

13
tatah-sankhas cha bheryas cha
panavanaka gomukah
sahasai 'va 'bhyahanyanta
sa sabdas tumulo 'bhavai

Then conches and drums and gongs, (other) drums, horns,
were played together suddenly, and that sound made a confused
clang.

Note here the variety of instruments which are sounded
together, and the gentle disparagement implied when it
says that the sound was tumula, which means "excited,
confused sound", a chaotic condition, something like the
confusion of tongues of the Tower of Babel seeming to be
suggested. This is a natural prerequisite for the orderly
unitive teaching of Brahmavidya (Science of the Absolute)
which is to follow.

14
tatah sevetair hayair yukte
mahati syandane sthitau
madhavah pandavas chai 'va
divyau sankhau pradadhmatuh

Then (both) standing in their great chariot, to which white
horses were yoked, Madhava (Krishna) and the son of Pindu
(Arjuna) blew (the two together) their divine conches.

Here we must notice the magic circle round the two personalities of Krishna and Arjuna, as if they were bracketed together, and having equal status in the context of something superior to merely human values. Both their conches have the coupling epithet divyau sankhau (a pair of divine conches). Further, they are in the same chariot - the charioteer, as we know, turns out to be the teacher of Brahmavidya (the Science of the Absolute) and Arjuna accepts discipleship (II, 7). The epithet mahati (great) is allied to brihat from which the word Brahma is derived.
The white horses are also symbolic of the

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neutrality of Brahmavidya in the same way as the white raiment (shubravastra) and white lotus (sveta-padma) are symbolic of the same neutrality in descriptions of the goddess Saraswati.

The names Madhavah and Pandavah suggest the intimate familial relationship of Krishna and Arjuna, though not the Guru-Sishya relationship of a later stage.

Subhadra, the sister of Krishna, was espoused by Arjuna. Madhava suggests a descendant of Madhu of the Yadava clan of whom Arjuna is a kinsman. The kinship is relevant here against the sishya­-hood to come later.

We must be on the lookout for similar appellations of Krishna and Arjuna throughout as indicative of the kind of context in which the text is to be understood, chapter after chapter, until full-fledged absolutism is finally reached.Patterns of spirituality of different contexts are revealed by such epithets.

15
panchajanyam hrishikeso
devadattam dhanamjayah
paundram dadhmau mahiisankham
bhimakarmii vrikodarah

Hrishikesa (Krishna) blew Panchajanya, and Arjuna blew
Devadatta. He of wolf-like appetite and deeds of enormity
(Bhima) blew his great conch, Paundra.

Panchajanya, the conch-shell of Krishna, may be said to belong to the context of the Panchajanas, who can be taken to be either the heterodox group near or about the Yadava country, perhaps outside the pale of Vedism or, as represent­ing more symbolically the five component parts of the soul according to the Samkhyas (Rationalists).

Arjuna's conch­shell, called Devadatta (given by God) seems to suggest his appreciation of Vedic values - being a disciple of Drona till his final disillusionment on the subject later on. Arjuna is not merely a pitriyani or worshipper of forefathers. Hence the reference to the gods or devas.

The conch-shell Panchajanya also bears reference in legend to being sea-formed out of the bones of a sea-giant.

Paundra , the conch-shell of Bhima, on the other hand, is suggestive of a prehistoric Siva-pattern of spirituality (tri­pundara being the mark on Siva's forehead). Epithets applied to Bhima also suggest the common man of that prehistoric time who just believed in plain human values based on common

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appetites, as the epithet vrikodarah meaning "wolf-stomach" would imply. He is the tough-guy or Hercules who takes a matter-of-fact attitude to life without flourishes or trimmings. Such a description is not repugnant to the character of Bhima as portrayed in the rest of the
Mahabharata.

16
anantavijayam raja
kuntiputro yudhishthirah
nakulah sahadevas cha
sughosha manipushpakau

Prince Yudhishthira, son of Kunti, blew Anantavijaya and
Nakula and Sahadeva blew (together) the Sughosha and
Manipushpaka.

Yudhishthira: firm in battle: eldest of the five sons of Pandu.
Nakula and Sahadeva: fourth and fifth (youngest) of the Pandu princes.

The name Anantavijaya (endless victory) is an apt name for the conch of Yudhishthira, in view of what the prince's name itself means, "Firm in battle". Both steadiness and endless victory may be said to go together. Notice here that in a proper order of precedence King Yudhishthira should have blown his conch before Arjuna and the charioteer Krishna. He is given a secondary place with the other two princes, Nakula and Sahadeva, whose conches Sughosha (good sounding) and Manipushpaka (floral-gemmed) suggest aesthetic values. Virtue and aesthetics do not count so much as the divine absolutism represented by Krishna and Arjuna. Even the common human value represented by Bhima, is given precedence over mere moral firmness and aesthetics in the poetical justice of the author Vyasa, common humanity being a more universal value than items of mere virtue or luxury.

17
kasyas cha parameshvasah
sikhandi cha maharathah
dhrishtadyumno viratas cha
satyakis cha'parajitah

And the King of Kasi, excellent bowman; Sikhandin, great
charioteer Dhrishtadyumna and Virata and the unconquered
Satyaki;

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The names of particular conch shells are not referred to
any more. The reference is now rather to bowmen and
charioteers. On the Kaurava side it should be remarked that
only one man, Bhishma, blew a conch-shell of any unique
nature. The rest was a hullabaloo of clanging instruments.
On the Pandava side, on the other hand, the clarion calls of
the conches come in clear graded succession, in which a
scale of values can be discerned, until this is also lost in the
common general uproar of the ranks.

18
drupado draupadeyas cha
sarvasah prithivi pate
saubhadras cha mahabahuh
sankhan dadhmuh prithak-prithak

Drupada and the sons of Draupadi, 0 Lord of the Earth, and
the son of Subhadra, of mighty arms, from all sides each
blew his conch separately.

The words sarvasah (on all sides) and prithak-prithak
distinct, separate) show that individual conch-blowings
were not completely lost in the general din, which came
from all sides. This suggests the meeting of the one and the
many without contradiction, itself a secret of dialectics.

19
sa ghosho dhartarashtranam
hridayani vyadarayat
nabhas cha prithivim chai'va
tumulo vyanunadayan

That loud blast, filling earth and sky with sound, pierced the
hearts of Dhritarashtra's sons.

This blast from the Pandava side "pierced the hearts of
the Kauravas". It touched "earth and sky", i.e. included all
possible hierophantic values as against the mere earthy
confusion of the conch-blasts of the Kauravas. Bhishma's
leonine roar only touches the earth. In what sense were the
hearts of the Kauravas bitten-through to the extent that they
lost confidence in all the mundane things they held dear?
New values, involving both heaven as well as earth, seemed
to be implicit in the message of the blast of the Pandavas.

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20
atha vyavasthitan drishtva
dhartarashtran kapidhvajah
pravritte sastrasampate
dhanur udyamya pandavah

Then, beholding the sons of Dhritarashtra standing
marshalled in order; while the flight of arrows (was)
beginning, the son of Pandu (Arjuna) of monkey-ensign,
took up his bow;

21
hrishikesam tada vakyam
idam aha mahipate
senayor ubhayor madhye
ratham sthapaya me 'chyuta

And 0 King, (said Sanjaya) he (Arjuna) spoke thus to
Hrishikesa (Krishna): Arjuna said: 0 Achyuta! Stop my
chariot right in the middle between the two armies.

It is most important to note the content of the last line
of Verse 20, which says that the shower of arrows was
starting and Arjuna had already taken up his bow. Up to this
point it is clear that as a warrior he is not suffering from any
weak-heartedness or doubt. It is usual for the generality of
commentators from raw undergraduates to much-labelled
academicians who claim to expound the Gita, to miss this
point and to describe Arjuna as if he was an ordinary coward
afraid of battle. He is to be distinguished from Uttara,
another well-known character in the Mahabharata who
conforms to the pattern of a mere coward. Arjuna is a
seasoned warrior. He has seen many a battle before. To
mistake him for a coward would be to miss the true
character of his confusion which is of a philosophical order
as we shall see.

The literary device of the first drop curtain (see
Introduction) is abandoned or lifted here with the word
mahipati (King) at the end of the first line of Verse 21.
Henceforth, we enter the Krishna-Arjuna samvada or
dialogue.

Actual circumstances belonging to this first part should
not be mixed up with considerations pertaining to the part
that follows. This latter takes a more abstract or
philosophical turn, though only of a first degree for the
present.

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The second line of Verse 21; "Stop my chariot, 0 Achyuta,
between the two armies" does not suggest anything of
cowardice either. Arjuna is prepared to risk going into the
no-man's land between the two armies, of which everyone
who knows warfare, ancient or modern, can understand the
danger.

To know the nature of Arjuna's peculiar confusion we
have to be exact about all these details, and determine
precisely the circumstances which favoured this
characteristic confusion from which, as a typical sceptic or
purva-pakshin, Arjuna is to suffer, according to the author,
Vyasa. Let us watch out for that moment. The words me
achyuta shows familiarity and Achyuta (the immovable)
already signifies something spiritual.

22
yavad etan nirikshe 'ham
yoddhukaman avasthitan
kair maya saha yoddhavyam
asmin ranasamudyame

So that I may behold these standing eager to fight by my
side in the present battle-undertaking;

23
yotsamanan avekshe 'ham ya
ete 'tra samagatah
dhartarashtrasya durbuddher
yuddhe priyachikirshavah

And might observe these here gathered together who desire
to please in war the evil-minded son of Dhritarashtra.

These verses are meant to be taken together. This is
significant. For the first time the two sides of the army tend
to be thought of together - not in the usual way of looking
only at the enemy. To an ordinary fighter his enemies have
prime importance. Arjuna, being already spiritually inclined,
says here definitely that he wants to go to the middle of the
two armies, equidistant from either of them, so that he
could see not only the army that he is to fight with, but also
the army he is to fight against. He wants to see both in one
unitive view from a central, neutral position.

The second line of Verse 23 seems laboured. It might
seem to contain too many words in naming the enemy, but
he uses the long description to demarcate clearly the
counterparts

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of the dialectical situation we have referred to already.
Arjuna is still conscious of the distinction between right and
wrong - he is not at all confused here, because of the epithet
durbuddhi (bad-minded) he uses against Duryodhana and
the whole army treated unitively as a single counterpart.
Common to both parties is the thirst for battle. This
indicates that the situation is already surcharged with war-
mindedness. Arjuna is caught in this longing for battle.
Such indications take the edge out of the argument, usually
advanced, that Krishna was himself war-minded or that he
ordered or even encouraged Arjuna to fight. He only
enabled Arjuna to recognize with clarity the imperative
nature of the situation in which he was already involved by
necessity.

The two verses together, which read so redundantly, have
only one purpose, which is to stress the difference between
Duryodhana's one-sided attitude of diffidence in Verse 10
as against Arjuna's own in which both parties are equally
involved. This altogether changes the complexion of
Arjuna's state of confusion, because he begins to view the
problem from a more unitive or humanistic standpoint.
This is not far removed from the sentiment of ahimsa
(compassion or non-killing). However, this ahimsa, for the
present, does not encompass the whole of life nor the whole
of humanity, which would be true contemplative
compassion, but, as we shall see, is limited to his own tribe
or at best includes his friends (i, 38). Arjuna's hatred for
Duryodhana still persists.

24
samjaya uvacha:
evam ukto hrishikeso
gudakesena bharata
senayor ubhayor madhye
sthapayatitva rathottamam

Samjaya said:
Thus addressed by Gudakesa (Arjuna), Hrishikesa (Krishna),
0 Bharata (Dhritarashtra), having stationed that excellent
chariot right in the middle between the two armies,

The discussion now enters the field of spiritual values.
"Between the two armies" is again underlined here to
remind us of the requirements of the dialectical situation.

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25
bhishmadrona pramukhatah
sarvesham cha mahikshitam
uvacha partha pasyai 'tan
samavetan kurun iti

Facing Bhishma and Drona and all the rulers of the earth,
(Krishna) said: 0 Partha (Arjuna)! behold these Kurus
gathered (here).

We should note how Krishna is careful not to influence
Arjuna's mind in any other way than what would be most
normal. He does not want Arjuna to look on both sides,
because he knows that might confuse him, and carefully
places Arjuna facing Bhishma and Drona of the opposing
armies only and, what is more explicit, he says "behold
these Kurus" and not "both these armies". Much trouble is
taken by the author Vyasa to make these matters
unequivocal

26
tatra 'pasyat sthitan parthah
pitrin atha pitamahan
acharyan matulan bhratrin
putran pautran sakhims tatha

Then Partha (Arjuna) saw standing, fathers as well as
grandfathers, teachers, maternal uncles, brothers, sons,
grandsons, and companions too.

Arjuna begins by seeing on the enemy's side many of his
own kith and kin, besides teachers. His confusion has thus
reason for beginning to be strengthened.

27
svasuran suhridas chai 'va
senayor ubhayor api
tan samikshya sa kaunteyah
sarvan bandhun avasthitan

And the son of Kunti (Arjuna), also seeing these relatives,
fathers in-law and friends, all standing, in both the armies.

The confusion worsens, because he finds kith and kin not
only in the opposite army, but on both sides. Confusion
thus becomes more confounded, thus starting the real
trouble with

92

which the rest of the Gita is concerned. The reference in
this verse to his friends or relations in both the armies is
important for the right appraisal of the delicate dialectics to
follow. This is the circumstance that finally succeeds in
overwhelming this battle-veteran and hero.

28
kripaya paraya 'vishto
vishidann idam abravit
drishtve 'mam svajanam krishna
yuyutsum samupasthitam

Filled by a supreme pity, in mental distress (Arjuna) said:
Beholding my own people, 0 Krishna, standing together,
wanting to fight,

The nature of Arjuna's state of mind is described by the first
words kripa paraya, usually translated as "great pity",
or "melted with pity". Such translations are inadequate to
bring out that special state of mind intended here. Paraya
definitely means of a transcendental or supreme order. What
kind of pity is this which is here qualified as supreme? It is
supreme to the extent that it envisages both the sides
involved in the conflict with at least the first degree of
dispassionate equality. But a residual conflict still seems to
persist in Arjuna's mind in the second line where there is
reference to svajanam (my own people). This shows he is
still a relativist and not a thorough-going absolutist in his
way of thinking. The duality of "my own people" versus
"strangers" remains. Hence the characteristic vishada or
"dejection" of this chapter.

29
sidanti mama gatrani
mukham cha parisushyati
vepathus cha sarire me
romaharshas cha jayate

My limbs fail and my mouth dries up, my body trembles and
my hair stands on end;

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30
gandivam sramsate hastat
tvak cai 'va paridahyate
na cha saknomy avasthatum
bhramati 'va cha me manah

(the bow) Gandiva slips from my hand, and my skin
feels as if burning all over, and I am unable to stand
and my mind is whirling round as it were;

The list of symptoms enumerated here are not those
exactly known to normal psychology or pathology. Among
them is one very intriguingly described as romaharshas
(hair standing on end). It is an expression familiar in India.
It marks a state of exaltation or ecstasy when a sentiment
thrills the body-mind. It is not always due to fear as has
been held. The kinship of the other symptoms covered in
these verses to the state of mind of Sri Rama in the first
chapters of the "YogaVasishtha" might help us in forming a
correct idea about its true character. It really belongs to the
mystical rather than to the merely pathological or
psychological order. The bow slips from his hand and this,
taken with his giddiness, shows general lassitude, or a lack
of zest or interest in life in general rather than any fear. Lack
of zest leads to a second stage marked in i, 47 where he
makes up his mind to throw away his bow with its arrow. A
still further third stage of the conflict of Arjuna is marked
in xi, 8 and 9 where it is of a more philosophical or religious
order.

31
nimittani cha pasyami
viparitani kesava
na cha sreyo 'nupasyami
hatva svajanam ahave

And I see conflicting portents, 0 Kesava (Krishna), nor do I
foresee good from killing one's own people in battle.

The enumeration of the symptoms continues here into a
more delicate domain. Premonitions are referred to. They
are described as viparitani, often translated as "adverse,"
but this should be more properly translated "contrary" or
"contradictory," i.e. at one moment good, at another bad; 
but not all the time bad.

The second line mentions spiritual factors proper, when
the conflict is conceived in the form of a doubt, thus
emerging from mere feelings into the domain of morals.
Arjuna sees no moral or spiritual merit in killing kinsmen.
Thus he is capable of formulating an opinion, although
confused. His is therefore no ordinary confusion, fear or
sadness.

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32
na kankshe vijayam krishna
na cha rajyam sukhani cha kim
no rajyena govinda
kim bhogair jivitena va

I do not wish for victory, 0 Krishna, nor kingdom nor pleasures;
what is kingdom to us, 0 Govinda (Krishna), what enjoyment, or
even life!

Arjuna's stand is further finalized here. He has what is known
as vairagya or detachment from the usual attractions or lures
of life. This vairagya is not different in essence from what
is required of a brahmachari as a seeker of wisdom who is to
have nitya-anitya-viveka (discrimination between eternal and
non-eternal). There is no confusion here. It conforms to what
is traditionally laid down as a prerequisite for spiritual
life even of a Vedantin.

Tyaga (relinquishment) and vairagya (detachment) have
always been considered essential for the wisdom-seeker.
Arjuna here is like a wise man or correct absolutist.
Arjuna's superiority here to a mere coward, as evident in
this verse, has to be kept in mind to avoid mistaking the
true nature of his conflict. By using the first personal plural
nah "us" here, he further takes it for granted that Krishna is
bound to agree with him.

33
yesham arthe kankshitam no
rajayam bhogah sukhani cha
ta ime 'vasthita yuddhe
pranama tyaktva dhanani cha

They for whose sake kingdoms, enjoyments and pleasures
are desired by us, are standing here in battle, having
renounced their interests in life and wealth.

Here Arjuna suddenly relapses into a partially relativist
standpoint such as we have noticed already. The inconsistency
mentioned by Krishna in ii, 11 becomes apt in the light of
this wavering alternation between an outright absolutism and
a confused form of relativism, even though the latter is not
without a touch of humanity implying contemplation.

95

We should note that Arjuna's confusion is treated in two
distinct instalments: within the limits of the first chapter
the confusion is of a vaguer, more emotional order (i, 47),
while its continuation in the earlier part of the next chapter
(ii, 8 and 9) is expressed in more properly formulated
terms. The character of the confusion which is legitimately
Vedantic in its nature, becomes fully evident only in ii, 8.
In the light of that definitive verse, all the preceding verses
must be understood. The transition from a puranic (i.e.
legend of a sacred character), to a Vedantic (i.e.
philosophical) context takes place between these two
chapters. The unformulated and elaborate remarks of
Arjuna, belonging to the pitriyana or ancestor-worship
pattern of spirituality which he normally represents
becomes marked in the verses that now follow.

34
acharyah pitarah putras
tathai 'va cha pitamahah
matulah svasurah pautrah
syalah sambandhinas tatha

Teachers, fathers, sons and also grandfathers; maternal
uncles, fathers-in-law, grandsons, brothers-in-law as well as
(other) kinsmen:

35
etan na hantum ichchhami
ghnato 'pi madhusudana
api trai lokyarajyasya
hetoh kim nu mahikrite

These I do not want to kill, though (they kill me), 0
Madhusudana (Krishna), not even for the sake of dominion
over the three worlds-how then for the sake of the earth?

The acharyah (teachers) mentioned here in Verse 34 evidently
refers to Drona, Kripa and others if any. The last word in
the first line pitamahah (grandfathers) must apply primarily
to Bhishma. Drona is only a guru to the extent that he is a
brahmin priest or a teacher of archery. He is not a guru in
the same sense that Krishna is a guru. Krishna is a guru
proper.

No confusion or vagueness is reflected in these decisive
words. They are based on a prime conviction on the part of

96

Arjuna which is right as far as it goes. Neither Krishna
himself nor any critic of Arjuna has met Arjuna's objection
fairly to the present day. If Arjuna was wrong why did not
his Guru Krishna correct him then and there? Those who
find fault with Arjuna too easily do not put their finger
precisely on any objectionable part of his stand here. The
inference should be that Arjuna's stand remains valid. At
least there is nothing weak in his position. Only someone
capable of advancing a better reason than Arjuna would be
justified in criticizing him, which is the privilege reserved
in the Gita only for Krishna, who is the teacher of
thoroughgoing absolutism, as we see him teaching later.
Politicians or patriots and partisans of closed religious
groups, even when they might be speaking in the name of
values understood in any relativist sense, should be
considered as being outside the privilege of laughing at
Arjuna here, which is that of Krishna as Guru alone, or else
of a teacher of outright absolutism.

The reference here to the three worlds prepares the way
for the attitude implicit in xi, 8, where it is stated more
finally but with only two worlds referred to. This might be
because the pitriyana (way of the forefathers) has
reference to Hades or Patala, while purer spirituality of
the Vedas thinks in terms of earth and heaven only, with
Bhuvarloka an intervening world of ether sometimes
mentioned, and frequented by celestial beings called
Siddhas.

36
nihatya dhartarashtran nah
ka pritih syaj janardana papam
eva 'srayed asman
hatvai 'tan atatayinah

Having killed the sons of Dhritarashtra, what delight can
there be for us, 0 Janardana (Krishna)? Only sin would
come to us after killing this marauding rabble.

It is striking to notice that tyaga or relinquishment is
taken for granted in the spiritual pattern to which Arjuna
conforms. Benefits of success here or hereafter do not occur
to him. This might be because his spirituality has been
nurtured in the pre-Aryan pattern of forest-dwelling hermits
with whom the India of that day must have abounded, especially
towards the south. The Ramayana (The epic "History of Rama") makes

97

the difference quite clear between the Aryan north and the
non-Aryan matrix of the south of India. Rama and
Lakshmana grew matted hair and lived on roots and fruits,
renouncing all pleasures of a city life, and visited many
hermits wearing tree-bark clothes. This is the touching
aspect of Indian spirituality into which Arjuna here can be
imagined to fit.

The word atatayinah does not merely mean desperadoes.
It means greedy opportunists, persons infatuated with
wrong or exaggerated notions of worldly values who
readily resort to premature aggression. If the meaning of
the word is to be further clarified it can only be done by
taking Arjuna's attitude of not wanting pleasure at all as its
opposite or counterpart. Such an interpretation would be in
keeping with the style of the Gita as we have pointed out,
like the word rajasa tyaga (wilful relinquishment) of xviii, 8
- renunciation with a vengeance, as it were. This is to be
balanced against proneness to greed. Some people are
easily greedy. They grab and take advantage of a situation.
Others give in too much. Both of these miss the neutral
middle way, which is that of the complete absolutist to be
understood, as we shall see, from the Gita. At any rate the
author, by this word itatayinah wants to indicate that the
army of the Kauravas is not motivated by any higher
moral or spiritual considerations than just greed or
attachment, as fully explained in xvii, 7 to 19 inclusive.

37
tasman na 'rha vayam hantum
dhartarastran svabandhavan
svajanam hi katham hatva
sukhinah syama madhava

And so we ought not to kill the sons of Dhritarashtra our
relations; for how, indeed, can we be happy after killing our
own people, 0 Madhava (Krishna)?

The tendency to be too negative is brought out here. Once
again pointed reference is made to the fact that the
Kauravas are Arjuna's relations. Although kindness would
be legitimate, kindness to a selected group of relations
would fall outside the scope of the spirituality proper of the
Gita.

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38
yady apy ete na pasyanti
lobhopahatachetasah
kulakshayakritam dosham
mitradrohe cha patakam

Even if they whose minds are overpowered by greed see no
wrong in the destruction of family (and) no crime in
treachery to friends.

39
katham na jneyam asmabhih
papad asman nivartitum
kulakshayakritam dosham
prapasyadbhir janardana

Yet why should we not learn to turn away from this sin, we
who do see wrong in the destruction of family, 0 Janardana
(Krishna)?

Here we come to considerations of wisdom or intelligence.
Arjuna says in effect, "Why should we not be wise as
against the foolishness of our relations?" Though Arjuna
bases his argument on wisdom, it still lacks the balanced
or neutral way of absolutism, leaving it still vitiated
by relativist considerations. At the end of Verse 39 we
find Arjuna still concerned about the destruction of the
family.

40
kulakshaye pranasyanti
kuladharmah sanatanah
dharme nashte kulam kritsnam
adharmo 'bhibhavaty uta

In destruction of family, the immemorial clan traditions
perish, and on the loss of tradition the whole clan comes
under the sway of lawlessness.

Arjuna here develops his own version of the evils of war
- not in terms of humanity as a whole, but in terms of a
closed or chosen group of people whose future is dear to
him. It is easy to concede that the killing out of some
important men in a family would lead to disruption of their
normal life - not only in a biological sense but as
representing a particular cultural growth including certain
spiritual values belonging to that clan. No one can deny
here again that Arjuna is right in what he says. His only
fault could be that he does not conform to the highest
standards of the absolutist way of life.

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41
adharmabhibhavat krishna
pradushyanti kulastriyah
strishu dushtasu varshneya
jayate varnasamkarah

When wrong (ways) prevail, 0 Krishna, the women of the
family become corrupt and when women become corrupt,
0 Varshneya (Krishna), mixing of clans arises.

Here the reference evidently is to racial mixing which
takes place generally in the wake of war between different
-coloured peoples. The fair Aryans and the darker
prehistoric peoples of India are the groups involved. The
complexion that is generally given to this argument is quite
the opposite of what it should be when we take note of the
fact that Arjuna and the women concerned here were non-
Aryans. They were of the darker-skinned peoples of India.
Therefore this reference to Arjuna's fears regarding tribal
or at best racial mixing should not he taken to lend any
support to varnashramadharma (the caste system) as
understood at the present day in India. Samkara (mixing) as
a philosophical concept occurs in iii, 24 and the theory of
caste is referred to in iv, 13 and discussed in ix, 33 and in
xviii, 41 and following verses from a totally different
perspective as we shall see.

42
samkaro narakayai 'va
kulaghnanam kulasya cha
patanti pitaro hy esham
luptapindodakakriyah

This mixing (of clans) leads (both the) family and the
destroyers of the family to hell, for their ancestors fall when
deprived of their offerings of rice-balls and water rites.

Here we see that, according to the notions of Arjuna, the
consequences of racial or tribal admixture is degradation
into the nether-world, both for those who are responsible
for the killing as well as for the family after the killing is
done.

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Simultaneously, the ancestors also suffer corresponding
degradation because of the lack of ritualistic support which
will keep them in the pitriloka (world of the ancestors).
Note too, that the agnihotra, the ritual fire-sacrifice of the
Aryans, is prominent by its omission, as also any precise
reference to four castes. The disciple Arjuna's vague and
crude prejudices in such matters are corrected by Krishna
the Guru later on in xv, 33, ix, 33, and xviii, 41 ff.

43
doshair etaih kulaghnanam
varnasamkarakarakaih
utsadyante jatidharmah
kuladharmas cha sasvatah

By these misdeeds of the destroyers of families (causing
intermixture of clans), the immemorial traditions of clan and
family are destroyed.

Arjuna's elaboration here of a theory of varnasamkara
(mixing of differently-coloured peoples) and spiritual
degradation of ancestors, conforms clearly to a pattern in the
context of pitriyana (ancestor worship), which represents the
position of the purva-pakshin (anterior sceptic). There is
reference to two other factors, namely jatidharma (family or
tribal traditions) and kuladharma (clan traditions) also.

Arjuna's position, therefore, suffers from some glaring errors
which it would be advantageous to notice even now.
Thinking of his relations and the particular group in front of
him, Arjuna has a closed and static attitude. He is interested
in preserving certain spiritual traditions of family and tribe
which he wrongly imagines to be permanent. One has to contrast
this closed static attitude with the open dynamic attitude
implied in the words of Krishna, when he himself as an absolutist
speaks of establishing dharma (right conduct) in the famous verses
IV, 7 and 8. There it is universal and for all time (continuing "from age to age").

44
utasanna kuladharmanam
manushyanam janardana
narake niyatam vaso
bhavati 'ty anususruma

Men of families whose clan traditions are destroyed, 0
Janardana (Krishna) are destined to live in hell - thus we
have heard.

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Arjuna's state of mind is continued here. The arguments
stated in the previous verse, it can be seen, do not cling
together so as to produce any clear conviction regarding
what he is aiming at. In the present verse the diffidence in
Arjuna becomes evident in the last words. His theories are
based on second-hand knowledge only: anususruma "thus
have we heard". He has no reference to any sastra (text).
Again there is nothing positive. His speech is regretful and
without the element of hope referring to heaven. The attitude
is negative as it refers only to naraka (hell). It must be
this negative quality which justifies the charge by Krishna
in II, 2 of anaryajushtam (unbecoming to an Aryan).
As conquerors the Aryans must have brought a more positive
form of spirituality, but one still condemned by Krishna in
ii, 42 to 46 - thus clearly indicating that the revaluation
of spirituality in the Gita is to be sought for as lying
between the relativist pitriyana (way of the forefathers)
and its counterpart, an equally relativist devayana (way
of the gods) represented, as we have said, by Bhishma and
Drona respectively.

45
aho bata mahat papam
kartum vyavasita vayam
yad rajyasukhalobena
hantum svajanam udyatah

Alas! a great sin are we engaged in committing in
endeavouring to kill our own people through greed for the
pleasures of kingdom!

Here Arjuna is obsessed by a sense of sin which is also
a negative factor. Although it must be said to his credit
that he is a renouncer and opposed to greedy grabbers like
Duryodhana, who must keep even illegitimate things, Arjuna's
only fault is that he is unable to find the middle way.

46
yadi mam apratikaram
asastram sastrapanayah
dhartarishtra rane hanyus
tan me kshemataram bhavet

It would be better for me, if the sons of Dhritarashtra, arms
in hand, should kill me, unarmed and unresisting, in the
battle.

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Arjuna's one-sided attitude becomes yet more pronounced.
He even goes to the extent of saying "that would be better
"instead of remaining neutral, and thus avoiding the sense
of sin. He wants to be aggressively neutral - in other
words, he falls into the error of a rajasatyagi (wilful,
over-active relinquisher), as stated in xviii, 8.

Politically-minded commentators on the Gita, whether
they have thought in terms of passive resistance or as
fighting for the freedom of a closed group, have invariably
fallen into a variety of error that could be brought under
rajasik (wilful, over-active) or tamasik (negligent action
based on ignorance) forms of action as explained in the last
chapter of the Gita. We shall come to these in due course,
but we want to say here that satyagraha (passive
resistance) or ahimsa (non-violence), inasmuch as they are
political weapons, have nothing in common with the
teaching of the Gita, which never makes a virtue of
necessity, although giving it due recognition. The Gita has
often been directly or indirectly pressed into the service of
perverted politicians and other interested people who held
such doctrines of action; but to distort the pure teaching of
the Gita in this way would he unjust and goes against the
interests of India's spiritual heritage in whose name even
these patriots speak. Relativist forms of war between
closed or static groups, whether clans, tribes or races or
even nations or religions, are not "righteous" according to
the Gita teaching which takes humanity's welfare only into
the scope of the word dharma (righteousness).

47
Samjaya uvacha
evam uktva'rjunah samkhye
rathopastha upavisat
visrijya sasaram chapam
sokasamvignamanasah

Samjaya said:
Thus having spoken in the midst of the battle, Arjuna sat
down in his chariot seat, casting aside his bow and arrow,
his mind overwhelmed with sorrow.

Arjuna's attitude as seen in this verse has deflected from
one of mere lassitude as in Verse 30, where the bow slips of
itself from his fingers, to one here where he himself
actively casts away both the bow and arrow.

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If we remember that he took up his bow in Verse 20 and
began to be confused when he looked at his relations
among those facing him in Verse 27, we find him now in an
opposite volte-face attitude. The intermediate gradations of
this transition have been carefully indicated by the author
Vyasa. Now Arjuna is definitely overwhelmed by grief.
Regarding the structure of this chapter; this section is
called the Arjuna vishada yoga, the Dialectical Conflict of
Arjuna. The conflict itself is examined within the limits of
this chapter in a very systematic way. This characteristic
conflict starts when Arjuna sees his relations on both sides
of the impending battle. The state of despondency at the
end of the chapter leaves him still undecided about what he
should think finally, until he becomes immobilized. Lost
between the two horns of a dilemma, the sorrow is the same
as his doubt. His doubt has two reciprocal aspects: the sense
of bravery and the sense of sin. These neutralize each other
into a central state not outside the context of Yoga or
contemplation.

In this chapter Arjuna first appears on the scene as an
ordinary hero, but at the end he becomes a typical purva
pakshin or anterior sceptic, full of doubts belonging to the
Guru-Sishya context of wisdom or contemplation. Within
the four walls of this chapter, the arguments move in
conformity with the strict norms of a dialectical method
carefully thought out by the author. From the point where
Arjuna sees relations on both sides, to where he sinks in his
seat as a characteristic doubter of values, one sees that the
argument moves delicately between reciprocal factors or
alternative possibilities of sin or evil.

This justifies the chapter as a whole being considered a
point of view or darsana of a yoga sastra, as the so-called
colophon at the end of the chapter claims it to be.
In conclusion here we must say that it is remarkable how
commentators have invariably said almost nothing on this
first chapter, when there are so many precious indications
of great epistemological and methodological value to be
derived from it. In fact a proper understanding of the first
chapter provides us with a key to all the chapters. Without
this key, commentaries are bound to be partially or totally
vitiated. Most of the commentators, one regrets to have to
say, are entirely off the mark in their remarks about
Arjuna's trouble. Sankara, the best of them, is himself
strangely silent, with no comment at all on this first
chapter.

104

itysrimad bhagavadgita supanishatsu brahmavidyayam
yogasastre srikrishnarjuna samvade
arjunavishadayogo nama prathamo 'dhyayah

Thus ends in the Upanishads of the Songs of God, in the
Science of the Wisdom of the Absolute, in the Dialogue
between Sri Krishna and Arjuna, the First Chapter, entitled
The Unitive or Contemplative Despondency of Arjuna.

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Written by Patrick Misson

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Published: 20 October 2008

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CHAPTER 2

UNITIVE REASONING

Samkhya Yoga

When we scan this chapter it is striking to note first of all that Arjuna's conflict is carried over from the previous chapter, where we should normally have expected it to terminate. The literary device of a Samjaya talking to a Dhritarashtra is again introduced. Krishna himself tries to arouse Arjuna from his apparent inertia or lethargy by sharp stinging expressions; but Arjuna, instead of being cowed down by them, justifies himself further in a manner that reflects a certain state of abandonment. The metrical change in Verses 5 to 8 indicates this. This is usual throughout the work wherever it rises to a pitch of rhapsody, where factors of feeling dominate. Arguments as such are thrown into the background. The rishi (sage-seer) style as found in the Vedas comes into evidence unmistakably. Here the structure of the verses attains a new dialectical perfection, reciprocal expressions being used with a striking symmetry, neutralizing factors or values into a vague sense of wonder of the numinous. Arjuna himself thus attains a new status in this chapter, as a representative contemplative disciple who belongs to the Guru-sishya context proper. The word sishya (disciple) is expressly used to refer to this new status in Verse 7.

In Verse 8 the nature of Arjuna's doubt is no longer mistakable. He says categorically that nothing on this earth nor in heaven will cure him of his painful conflict. He is not unlike Nachiketas of the Katha Upanishad who refuses boons belonging to the relativist world. In fact the structure of all the Upanishads reveals the same initial attitude of a disciple in one form or another. Arjuna's conflict, condition and attitude are no exception. From the mere emotion of the first chapter, here in the second chapter it attains the status of a philosophical doubt which he himself is quite capable of stating consciously and precisely in conformity with other shastras (textbooks).

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The nature of his sorrow is such as to dry up the indriyas or senses collectively. He is numbed or dazed intellectually, while in the previous chapter his mouth was parched and he was trembling. We should understand, from the difference between Arjuna in these two phases in these two chapters, that the author in this second chapter enters into the subject proper. This is where the Gita-Acharya (teacher) begins the role of a Guru, instead of being merely a charioteer who brings Arjuna's chariot into the midst of the ranged armies.

Krishna's role as an acharya is thus inaugurated properly with Verse 11. The smile on his lips in Verse 10 is characteristically in contrast with the pessimistic state of Arjuna who is gloomy and pensive. Between this bright smile and the tedium vitae is to take place presently a normal dialectical revaluation of wisdom values.

The value under the caption Samkhya (rationalism) is what is indicated as the general overall concluding title of this chapter. But we find that Verse 39 draws a line between two distinct parts of the chapter itself. This, however, is no objection, as the first part is a revaluation of Samkhya (heterodox rationalist school) in terms of Yoga, and the second part is called buddhi yoga (rationalism treated again dialectically, i.e. as a Yoga). Buddhi yoga, which in essence is also rational, is here also stated in revalued terms as a Yoga. This intriguing term will be defined later in this chapter. The title Samkhya Yoga (Unitive Reasoning) for the whole chapter is therefore not unjustified. If we should expect to find the pure Samkhya of Kapila in the earlier part of the chapter, we shall be disappointed. This has been a fecund cause of confusion on the part of several critics of the Gita (e.g. Edgerton and Raju) who discredit the Gita as a systematic treatise on this score. The Gita has an inner structure of its own, and each chapter (as we have stated in the Introduction) has its own frame of reference.

A growing number of Western professors, among whom must be included many of their disciples who happen to be Indians, make the inexcusable error of thinking that the Gita is a theistic religious classic rather than a philosophical treatise, a smriti (code of laws as of Manu, Yajnavalkya, Parashara, etc.) or dharma-shastra (textbook of social obligations) rather than a shruti (revealed wisdom-utterance) or upanishad (wisdom-teaching of a Guru).

When the discussion or samvada which is a philosophical discourse between Guru and sishya opens properly in this

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second chapter, such a view is glaringly belied, for here we see that the discussion enters into the very heart of rationalism which is philosophy and cannot possibly be conceived to be either theological or religious in the plain meaning of these terms. Full examination of the other chapters will enable us to establish firmly the fact that the Gita is first and foremost a philosophical work and that the references to matters of religious practice are only incidental and non-obligatory, covering aspects of applied wisdom only.

Samkhya (rationalism) when treated unitively attains the status of a Yoga, and buddhi (pure reason), when employed to reconcile counterparts, also attains to the same Yoga status. That Samkhya and Yoga are the same has been plainly stated in v, 4-5. No possible doubt should remain about this as far as the author Vyasa's attitude towards the two schools is concerned.

1
samjaya uvacha
tam tathi kripaya vishtam
asrupurnrakulekshanam
vishidantam idam vakyam
uvacha madhusudanah

Samjaya said:
To him who was thus filled with tenderness (kripa) whose eyes were filled with tears, and agitated and who was in distress, the Destroyer of Madhu (Krishna) spoke these words:

Kripaya avishtam: The usual meaning given is that Arjuna was "overcome with pity ". We should notice that the phrase kripaya paraya vishto has already appeared in. i, 28. The kripa, "pity", there has sometimes been interpreted as kripaya-aparaya "non-transcendental pity"- correctly enough according to the rules of Samskrit grammar -  but we need not stretch the meaning so far to see the distinction implied between the qualified kripa of the first chapter and the plain kripa here. Further, the word comes from the same root from which the word karpanya "negative state of spirit"in 11, 7 is derived. If we note further the expression in ii, 49 - kripanah phalahetavah (end-motivated persons are poor), we can see that the term is used irrespective of the subject or object of pity. Here in this

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verse it is unqualified pity as distinct from pity for relations in an actual historical context as in Chapter i. This difference will become more definite philosophically with the words of Arjuna in the next verse.

Here the emotion of Arjuna undergoes some slight sublimation as we can see by comparison with i, 47. There he is just obstinate; here he melts into tears. The process of sublimation later on enables him to formulate his inner conflict in the form of a finalized doubt in Verse 6, supported by a variety of dialectics of his own so masterfully enunciated in Verse 5. The visible aspects of Arjuna's inner conflict are graphically described in the phrase asrupurnakulekshanam (with both eyes agitated and filled with tears). He has become immobile here in all other respects except for his eyes. This detailed description makes him stand on the threshold of a truly contemplative life, as the agitation of the eyes being due to doubt only, affiliates him more closely to the context of contemplation.

The meaning of the vishada (conflict) should also be understood in the sense of being nearer to a doubt than to any gross emotion.

Madhusudana (Slayer of Madhu) as applied to Krishna, balances with Arjuna here as a non-combatant warrior in the field.

2
sribhagavan uvacha
kutas tva kasmalam idam
vishame samupasthitam
anaryajustam asvargyam
akirtikaram arjuna

Krishna said:
In (the midst of this) difficulty whence comes to you this dejection, typical of non-Aryans (anarya), heaven-barring and disreputable, 0 Arjuna?

Here the double literary device at the beginning of this chapter, of Samjaya reporting the actual dialogue in Verse 1 and again in Verse 9, as if the curtain drops and rises twice before the actual dialogue - the central samvada proper which is to hold the stage - which begins properly in Verse 11, has its own significance. It is in the light of this dramatic structure

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that we must interpret the meaning of Verses 2 and 3 particularly; otherwise the second line here which refers to factors such as svarga (heaven) and kirti (social reputation) and anaryajushtam become inexplicable.

The imperative need for action in this critical situation, considered here in actual historical terms, belongs to the canvas rather than the painting. To identify it with the proper teaching of the Gita as many have done (see our remarks on the realism of Sri Aurobindo in the Introduction) is unpardonable.

The phrase anaryajushtam (typical of non-Aryans) deserves pointed attention. From history we know that the Aryans subjugated India by grabbing more and more lands. The common amorphous matrix constituting the greater part of India proper has always suffered from an over-generous attitude which amounts to a form of defeatism. Sri Rama, the Aryanized king of Ayodhya, who penetrated southwards, was received everywhere, even by Guha, not to speak of rishis and ashram-ites such as Shabari, with great respect and cordiality instead of opposition, with offerings of roots and fruits. This passive or negative attitude characterized India even at the time of the invasion of Alexander, and has been confusing to the minds of all invaders ever since. We may even consider that in recent history Gandhi's "passive fight" was too much for the puzzled foreigners who have left India as much out of bewilderment as for any other reason. Such negativism has been expressed in many ways. Some yogis taken to Rome by conquerors are known to have publicly burned themselves to death. This marks the limit of such a negativist attitude. This is the essentially non-Aryan character referred to here.

Krishna is not opposed to this negative attitude, inasmuch as he preaches nivritti marga, the via negativa or path of negation proper to contemplation; but he wants it to be applied only in the domain of wisdom. In the field of action he employs ordinary reasoning when action should be countered by its reaction in the ordinary sense. That is why pointed reference is made here in this verse to the critical situation where the attitude of Arjuna becomes completely out of place, when we take into account how deeply Arjuna was actually involved or caught within the imperatively necessary aspects of the situation. He did not realize that he had hardly any margin of choice left.

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3
klaibyam ma sma gamah partha
nai 'tat tvayy upapadyate
kshudram hridayadaurbalyam
tyaktvo 'ttishtha paramtapa

Give not yourself to impotence, 0 Partha (Arjuna). It does not befit you. Cast off this base faintheartedness; arise, 0 Terror of Foes!

Here Krishna further states his objections in piquant terms. He refers even to faintheartedness with a view to goading Arjuna to action in the given situation, although the epithet would hardly apply to the veteran hero. Krishna is not talking as a Gita acharya here at all, but rather as a charioteer and friend who finds his master in a confused plight, and therefore the further epithet kshudram (base), which would be too much ordinarily to be applied to Arjuna, becomes permissible only in the light of extreme familiarity and earnest interest in Arjuna as a friend. The word klaibyam (impotent) is also too much, if not seen in the light of camaraderie. Many persons who have written about the Gita have too easily taken the side of Krishna here, and wanted, as it were, to pat Arjuna on the back patronizingly. This privilege must be reserved for Krishna as a friend, or even for Krishna considered as a Gita acharya. But for pundits, patriots and politicians, of the rank and file who are not his comrades, to use this same patronizing tone towards Arjuna's attitude is, to say the least, out of place, as Arjuna's position is superior to all of them, and inferior to Krishna or a Guru of equal status only.

4
Arjuna uvacha:
katham bhishmam aham samkhye
dronam cha madhusadhana
ishubhih pratiyotsyami
pujarhav arisudana

Arjuna said:
How could I, 0 Slayer of Madhu (Krishna), encounter with arrows in battle Bhishma and also Drona who are worthy of worship, 0 Slayer of Foes (Krishna) ?

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The definite and precise reference here by name, first to Bhishma and then to Drona, who are not Gurus in the same sense - Bhishma being only respected as a grandsire - but both equally covered by the title "worthy of reverence", sharpens Arjuna's doubt to a further degree. The instrument with which he is to fight them is also referred to; the relevance being that it was Drona who taught him archery, and it was to Bhishma that he could trace his physical prowess needed for archery. These factors, the arrows and the two enemies, are looked upon as counterparts in the same plane of actuality, thus paving the way for the argument in the next verse, which underlines the nature of the dilemma in greater detail.

The prefix prati (against) is used to accentuate the duality implicit in the situation, which seems to Arjuna to be absurd. It is in fact absurd to anybody, in the way Arjuna puts it, and it can only be reasonable in a fully revalued way of absolutism implied in xviii, 66 where all duties of relativist life are to be thrown away.

5
guran ahatva hi mahanubhavam
sreyo-bhoktum bhaikshyam api 'ha loke
hatva 'rthakamams tu gurun ihai 'va
bhunjiya bhogan rudhirapradighan

Desisting from the killing of the Gurus who are highly honourable, it would be more meritorious in this world even to have to eat of a beggar's pittance. Choosing (on the other hand) to kill these Gurus as fortune - seekers, I should be feasting even here on blood-stained benefits of life.

This verse shows Arjuna as one who can employ dialectics with a vengeance, leading to a doubly negative or unfavourable judgment. Duryodhana, who does not claim to be a dialectician, can stand on simpler, plainer and firmer ground. Arjuna's difficulty, which was hitherto stated strictly as within the domain of actuality that involved here-and-now values only, is in this verse restated with one important difference, indicated by the word sreyas (something morally or spiritually better) thus introducing for the first time into the discussion a positive spiritual value-factor and not merely worldly advantage.

Even as such it does not refer to life hereafter as the repetition of iha (here) clearly indicates. In fact it is Arjuna's

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desire to be a better man even here itself which distinguishes him from Duryodhana. He is an aspirant or a candidate for wisdom, though still a realist.

The metrical structure of this verse is meant to reveal an emotional content rising to the pitch - though not of a rhapsody here - at least to that of a spiritual agony or angoisse.

The note of this agony is not unlike that of Yama (Death), the Guru in the Katha Upanishad, who wailingly pleads with the sishya Nachiketas to dissuade him from asking the final boon of all, respecting wisdom. There it is the Guru who wails, but it makes no difference to the quality of the rhetorical mode employed, which is common to both Guru there and sishya here.

Another peculiarity to note about this verse is that the same Gurus are referred to with almost opposite titles. In one place they are called mahanubhavas (people of great sympathy) and at another place arthakamaha (grabbers of goods).

This would seem paradoxical and, except in the light of the special dialectical structure that we have suggested, it would remain unresolved. In fact many have indeed mistranslated or misinterpreted the word arthakamaha "well-wishers" by Bhagavan Das.)

The word iha (here), appearing in its simple form in the second line, appears again, repeated in the third line more emphatically as iha eva (here itself), which cannot be looked upon as accidentally inserted by the author, Vyasa. It is just here that Arjuna's dialectic fails to work as applied to value-factors, because both these value components belong to an here and now order, but Arjuna has the excuse of speaking in this chapter as an empiricist or just as a rationalist. As a correct sceptic ought to be, he puts the question in its sharpest form as any practically-minded religious man even of our own times - scrupulous of life here - might do.

In either of the alternatives, still treated dualistically by Arjuna after the manner of the Nyaya-Vaiseshikas (logical-empiricists), or at best the Samkhyas (rationalists), the result for him is in the form of an adverse verdict. He must either suffer poverty or enjoy life with a sense of the guilt of having out-done a fellow-man. This doubly negative result is characteristic of a form of reasoning which appears very subtle at first sight, but is still tinged with the blemish of dualism - as Krishna will point out in due course. According to Krishna, who

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is an absolutist, he is going to show how Arjuna can surmount his duality by the right use of dialectics, by applying this method only to unitive values which come within the scope of contemplation, and not merely for decisions between alternative advantages here in the world of multiplicity and action. Dialectics is conducive to unitive understanding only, and spoils the case when applied to ordinary situations in life where usual ratiocinative methods or logic would be the proper instrument to employ.

It might be well also for us to note that the expression ahatva "non-killing" is not enforced on Arjuna. It is a contingent factor from which he derives the theoretical consequences of poverty, etc., which factor and consequences are not directly connected as cause and effect. He is sentimental and speaks like a theoretical philosopher when a practical necessity confronts him. It is on this score that Krishna pulls him up quite readily in Verse 11.

Arjuna may be said to resemble a man who has a telescope, but who looks through the wrong end. Instead of ascending from the necessary to the contingent, he descends from factors which are not strictly of a necessary order to imaginary and conflicting necessities. He is simply overwhelmed by a logic of emotions which goes always contrary to the logic of pure reason, spoiling both natural spontaneity in emotion and purity of reason.

6
Na chai 'tad vidmah kataran no gariyo
yad va jayema yadi va no jayeyuh
yan eva hatva najijivishamas
te 'vasthitah pramukhe dhartarashtrah

Neither is it clear which would be of greater advantage to us: that we win or that they win over us. Killing whom we should no more wish to live, those very persons are standing ranged before us, the progeny of Dhritarashtra.

The confounding of reason and emotion comes out here, each factor having equal force. To add to the vagueness, there is the express use of the plural. He speaks now apparently almost as a representative of both the contending parties - thus indirectly thinking of the evils of war in most general terms.

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His concern, however, to save humanity from the given effects of war, seems to overleap itself when he again points to the sons of Dhritarashtra - as if he is concerned more for them than for his own side, which commonsense should lead us to expect. Actually we find him more concerned for his enemies. This is because his logic is coloured by his emotions and he is carried beyond even the neutral ground of common-sense to an extreme position untenable either from common-sense or contemplative norms. His only excuse is perhaps that Bhishma and Drona, who belong to a spiritual context, are both ranged against him. They represent spiritual values but happen to be on the enemy side which already enjoys a majority.

Na jijivishama (we do not wish to live) - can only legitimately mean that he is concerned with humanity who must be impoverished by the extermination of spiritual leaders or Gurus. Note his plural again here by which he speaks for all, including his enemies and Krishna himself.

7
karpanyadoshopahat vabhavah
prichchhami tvam dharmasammudhachetah
yach chhreyah syan nischitam bruhi tan me
sishyas to 'ham sadi mam tvam, prapannam

Struck down by the evil of a tender disposition, with a mind confounded in regard to what is right to do, I ask you: that which is definitely more meritorious, that do indicate to me. I am your disciple; do discipline me coming thus for refuge to you.

Now the style reverts to the singular. Here Arjuna is able himself to state clearly the nature of his trouble: (1) that a negative state of mind has overtaken him and (2) that his reason is therefore clouded about the choice before him. These are the two factors involved. The cure for one is clearer reasoning (heterodox samkhya yoga). For the other the cure is the method of buddhi-yoga (orthodox rationalism treated unitively) which would make him more Aryan and relieve him of the sense of sin. These exactly are just the remedies to be applied by Krishna in the remainder of this chapter.

The word dharma (righteousness, connoting also inner tendencies to natural activity) is used by Arjuna both in the sense

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of "conduct" as used by Buddhist writers, and in its purer psychological connotation.

Although a warrior's sense of honour is appealed to by Krishna in Verses 32-35 of this chapter, the main part of the chapter is concerned with rationalism of an "objective" order. The reference to honour, etc. fits into this chapter as the common-sense counterparts or corollaries of a rational matter-of-fact attitude.

The word shreyah (spiritually meritorious) again indicates a superior human value belonging to contemplative wisdom, especially when taken together with the word sishya (disciple), which makes him essentially not a warrior merely, but principally a wisdom-seeker. Also the word sadhi (teach) helps to confirm this way of looking at the situation. This is the cue for the samvada or Guru-sishya dialogue, which is to hold the stage.

8
na hi prapasyami mama 'panudyad
yach chhokamuchchhosanam indriyanam
avapya bhumav asapatnam riddham
rajyam suranam api cha 'dhipatyam

I cannot visualize either what could rid me of this distress which dries up the senses in this way - even should (it transpire that) I obtain unrivalled dominion of the earth's plenty or overlordship of the gods in heaven too.

The resemblance of Arjuna, who is here an equally thorough-going wisdom-seeker, to Nachiketas of the Katha Upanishad (to whom we have already referred) becomes unmistakably evident here. He is for the first time referring to heaven and lordship over the gods, which itself is strange inasmuch as till now he was thinking of negative factors only. He who preferred to be a mendicant begging his way now also refers to the uttermost limit of worldly prosperity. He rejects both of these possible futures because they are only relative values, while he seeks merit in an absolute sense. As a disciple in any other Upanishad, the implications in this verse must make it indubitably clear to the reader that the Gita is not concerned with conduct here, or even the relative heaven-determined values of the Vedas, but only with ultimate or absolute factors of supreme wisdom. Even the highest of the shining gods are to be left behind if Arjuna is to find satisfaction. If Krishna

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refers in his teaching hereafter to Heaven and relativist values, they therefore become of incidental importance only (e.g. Verses xi. 32 and 37 mention heaven only for purposes of methodology. We shall clarify this in due course. It is enough to state here that this has nothing to do with the final teaching of the Gita).

Like the third boon of Nachiketas, Arjuna is not going to be satisfied with anything short of the highest wisdom, for he indicates here that only such wisdom can cure him of his agony of spirit. This condition of Arjuna is not symptomatic of any known pathological disease or psychological abnormality. It is only found expressed in such Guru-sishya textbooks as the "Vivekachudamani" of Sankara - where the disciple compares himself to an animal trapped in a raging forest-fire (Verse 36).

9
samjaya uvacha
evam uktva 'hrishikesam
gudakesah paramtapah
na yotsya iti govindam
uktva tushnim babhuva ha

Samjaya said:
Having spoken thus to Hrishikesa (Krishna), Gudakesa (Arjuna) the Terror of the Foe, saying, "I will not fight"to Govinda (Krishna), lapsed finally into silence.

10
tam uvacha hrishikesah
prahasann iva bharata
senayor ubhayor madhye
vishidantam idam vachah

On this Hrishikesa (Krishna), with a semblance of smiling, 0 Bharata (Dhritarashtra), spoke these words to him who was in grief between the two armies:

The Samjaya-Dhritarashtra device is used for these two verses only, for the express purpose of setting the stage for the impending full-dress discourse which starts at Verse 11, from which point onwards it becomes fully philosophical.

These verses reveal the attendant circumstances in the actual world most delicately counterpoised in every respect, thus forming the correct defined situation on firm ground, upon

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whose basis the theoretical discussion can proceed. To the extent that the questioner is practically-minded, the answerer has to be downright conclusive in his reply. The concrete question requires an apodictic reply. It is tit for tat. Before the sweeping generalizations of Krishna follow, therefore, it is necessary to review in a short span the ensemble of the situation. These two verses serve that very purpose.

Hrishikesa and Gudakesa, balancing sound as well as meaning, suggest equality between Guru and disciple. Reference is also made in favourite terms to senayor ubhayor madhye (between two armies) to indicate the perfect neutrality of the absolutist way of life preached by the Guru Krishna. The smile of a Guru is the only actor differentiating him from the gloomy disciple.

Vachah (the word) is singular and not plural. This is most significant. All the words used in the chapter are supposed to be upavikyanam (elaborations of one central Word), the Verbum or Logos or the AUM as definitely stated in the Mandukya Upanishad. The same singular is strikingly repeated in x. 1 and xi. 1. So this cannot be just the accidental usage of the author, Vyasa.

Further, Arjuna definitely says "I will not fight "which hitherto he has not dared to say to Krishna. It is this brazen attitude which should justify the oft-repeated words of Krishna in later chapters, in which he seems to order Arjuna to fight. Although the Gita is free from obligatory injunctions, this style of speech here arises incidentally from Arjuna's words. To the extent that such an admonition is meant to counteract this obstinacy, it is in place. But the main character of such advice should be understood as permissive and never fully mandatory because vidhi or mandate is repugnant altogether to an Upanishad which is a shruti (revealed utterance of wisdom) and not a smriti (code of laws). Those who interpret such expressions as injunctions will find themselves completely in the wrong by the time they reach the end of the Gita, wherein Krishna finally says to Arjuna: "Do as you like "(xviii, 63) which, taken together with "abandon all duties "(xviii, 66) makes the non-mandatory character of the reference to fighting unequivocal. The various references to the subject of fighting will be dealt with as occasions arise. The reader however, must watch out for a gradation or change of sense even in the permissive or advisory character according to the proper context of each chapter.

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Notice that Arjuna remains no whit less a warrior (Paramtapa means "Consumer of Foes"), in spite of his being silent. It is still the silence of a great hero and not that of a coward.

His doubt belongs to the realm of wisdom and not to his physical prowess. Sankara's long-drawn comment on this verse to establish that "knowledge alone, and not by knowledge conjoined with works" is the conclusive teaching of the Gita, could be taken for granted by us in the present commentary without any arguments, because we look upon the Gita as a "dialectical revaluation" of wisdom into which obligatory works do not enter at all. The Gita is not a Dharma Shastra or Smriti treating of obligatory injunctions. Any reference to such in the Gita is incidental to the narrative or discussion and is of a recommending or permissive character only and never of an obligatory character.

The term iva (as if) applied to the smile of Krishna is a peculiarity of the lingua mystica familiar in the Upanishads (e.g. Mundaka Upanishad, 1. 2 , 4-6) by which the edge is, as it were, taken off the actuality of the description, tending to make it more perceptual and thus more in keeping with a contemplative text.

11
Sribhagavan uvacha
asochyan anvasochas tvam
prajnavadams cha bhashase
gatasum agatasums cha
na 'nusochanti panditah

Krishna said:
You are sorry for those with whom sorrow is unreasonable. You speak in terms of reason too. Veritable philosophers (pandits) are not affected in regard to those whose breath has gone and those whose breath has not gone.

We begin the samvada (Guru-sishya dialogue on wisdom) noting straight away that it starts off in no uncertain words. The position of a thorough-going absolutist is stated for all it is worth, to be elaborated stage by stage afterwards. The second line of this verse has been much misunderstood and misinterpreted, seriously enough to vitiate and compromise

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the whole message of the Gita in commentaries by people who did not realize that the Gita is based on dialectical reasoning and not on mere ratiocination.

Note the word cha (and) in this line which has invariably been taken to be identical or interchangeable with va (either-or). Though seemingly small, there is a world of difference between the two meanings. The latter meaning would be tantamount to upholding a model of a spiritual man who is indifferent or cold-hearted when a person is dead, while the former meaning, which conforms to the text and is the only meaning possible here, supports a perfected wise man or pandit who has transcended both the aspects of life and death here, treated together, as inevitable dual sides of our relative life here and now. The Gita preaches ahimsa (non-hurting) in later chapters. Indifference in causing death is not therefore compatible with the teaching of the Gita at all. Gandhi's Gita commentary has made an effort to make this clear by other evidences of his own, which has left many people unconvinced. The delicate difference implied in this opening verse when properly understood would not require long-drawn arguments to bend the Gita to support any special doctrine of ahimsa which is only a natural corollary to the Gita's chief teaching of wisdom, as we shall have ample occasion to see.

The word panditah refers expressly, not to a man of action like Arjuna, but to men of wisdom, those who understand. Between the two lines of this verse - the first reflecting necessity, the second reflecting free contingency - the argument will be seen like a pendulum, now swinging to one side, now to the other. The wide-awake student of the Gita should not be too hasty or hurried in deriving rigid snap judgments about what the Gita teaches from isolated verses, as has been done so often.

Note that sorrow is the central consideration on which the verse revolves. The concept of shoka (compassion) is the spiritual value with which the dialogue begins. The disparity between wisdom and sympathy, reason and emotion, is the subject for reconciliation - the one in terms of the other, retaining both unitively by Yoga. The duality between the two persists in Arjuna, producing a conflict or doubt which constitutes the major problem of the Gita as a whole.

That Arjuna himself has strongly-rooted rival theories about right and wrong, virtue and sin, is revealed in i. 40-45. Now that he seeks nothing short of absolute wisdom, as revealed in ii. 8, it

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is in reference to these two incompatible attitudes; one being still relativist, the other belonging to wisdom, that Krishna here speaks outrightly, pointing out the anomaly of Arjuna's position.

In understanding the meaning of asochyan (those not to be grieved for) we have to be guided by the indications in Verse 5 above which refers to the Gurus, as well as by the absolutist ideas which follow immediately in this chapter.

Sankara suggests that the reference applies to such people as Bhishma and Drona and states "they deserve no grief for they are men of good conduct and are eternal in their real nature". Arjuna has enumerated in detail all those for whom he is concerned in i. 34. Even if the two Gurus are exempt from the pity normal to the situation, the case of all others who include good, bad and indifferent persons on both the sides (as explicitly mentioned in i. 27) is not covered by Sankara's explanation. There is an over-all answer to the question: "Who are the persons meant here as not deserving or incapable of being sympathetically thought of?" which is contained in this very Chapter (Verses 12 to 38 inclusive).

The same is again implied in xi. 33, where Krishna states that the men have already been killed by him and his (Arjuna's) killing is only incidental to the situation. This type of over-all absolutist argument need be resorted to only last of all. On the lines of Sankara's suggestion we could think of two groups to whom the remark can possibly apply.

These could be those emancipated from necessity by their intelligence and freedom of choice in action, like Bhishma and Drona who have deliberately chosen the path of war, and those like the rest of the rank and file caught helplessly in a general and imperative war situation. The former can take care of themselves and the latter cannot, even if they thought that war was an evil.

12
na tv eva 'ham jatu na 'sam
na tvam ne 'me janadhipah
na chai 'va na bhavishyamah
sarve vayam atah param

Further, never was I non-existent, nor you, nor these chiefs of men; neither shall we, all of us, ever cease becoming hereafter.

The initial line of argument adopted in this chapter is clearly indicated here. It makes the absolutist position more

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striking than in the second line of Verse 11. It asserts at once the eternal existence not only of the individual (or in terms of a subjective soul), but of the whole group of humanity involved. In fact the whole situation, as we shall see shortly, is treated sub specie aeternitatis (under the category of the eternal) as Spinoza put it. The reference to the kings or chiefs of men as such, who are also, as it were, to be considered eternal, seems to be asking too much for us to believe. In so far as no king can really die ("The King is dead, Long Live the King!"), even this apparent exaggeration becomes justified.

This chapter expressly faces the problem from an apodictic or sharply matter-of-fact point of view. A bad disease needs a drastic remedy. The rot of confusion has to be stopped before it worsens. That is why the argument plunges without apology into the heart of the problem. The impossible character of the arguments thus become understandable.

Note also that eternity is conceived both retrospectively and prospectively. The inner logical or methodological order maintained is striking. Krishna refers to himself first. Even as plural entities, human beings are to be treated in the light of the eternal. The conflict between the one and the many can be resolved in the light of higher reasoning as elsewhere explained.

GENERAL NOTE ON VERSES 13 TO 21

The approach of heterodox Samkhya is evidenced in these
verses but we should remember it is not Samkhya as Kapila
or even Ishvarakrishna presented it in the Samkhya Karika
that is here adhered to. The Gita restates Samkhya to suit its
own doctrine of the Absolute. In other words the Gita is a
dialectical revaluation in terms of Yoga of pure Samkhya as
such, without omitting the technical terms belonging to
Samkhya method and not entirely breaking away from the
epistemological frame of reference proper to the Samkhya
system. We should look here for a Samkhya-Yoga still
viewed from a heterodox angle, leaving the same to be
reviewed from an orthodox angle, with buddhi (pure reason
or intelligence) as a central value, in the second half of this
chapter, after Verse 39, and thereafter to be known under the
caption of buddhi-yoga - buddhi there being not essentially
different from the Samkhya attitude. Both buddhi and
Samkhya therefore are

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covered by the general title Samkhya-Yoga without any real
contradiction, at the end of the chapter.

13
dehino 'smin yatha dehe
kaumaram yauvanon jara
tatha dehantarapraptir
dhiras tatra na muhyati

As there is here in the body for the embodied, childhood,
youth, old age, so also the passing on to another body
in the same manner; those firm in mind are not thereby
bewildered.

Let us focus attention on the word dehi (body-owner or
author-agent). It almost suggests some entity like Launcelot
Gobbo's conscience which hangs at the neck of his heart,
having an almost empirical status so repugnant to the way of
thinking of the Buddhist Vijnanavadins, and no less so even
with Advaitins of the Gaudapada school. The apparent
grossness here is explicable, since any theoretical discussion
of a subject implies its own purva pakshin (anterior sceptic)
and, in order to convince a person, one has to meet him on
his own terms with his own background. The empiricism
has to be met by an empirical attribute if it is to be revalued.
Rationalistic heterodox Samkhya tended to realism. When
the inner man had to be distinguished clearly from the
physical man, it became necessary for the Gita to employ
the word dehi (body-owner) with the same realism which
we find accentuated, until by Verse 23 all vestiges of
materiality are abolished. But this abolition begins
significantly only after Verse 22, which again is a kind of
rhapsody where realism and idealism merge, as it were,
bursting into song.

This verse recommends a view of reality in the form of a
flux pertaining to a general process of becoming. Childhood,
youth and old age are three stages known even to
realists, which are to be viewed, not statically, but as
flowing organically in terms of duration. Time itself is not
yet abolished.

Rebirth is introduced as a natural consequence belonging
to the same order of flux or becoming. Metempsychosis is
therefore taken for granted as a natural corollary even of a
realistic and rationalistic attitude to life. The word dhira
here refers not merely to a brave man one a battlefield, but
perhaps

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more aptly refers to one who is capable of taking a firm
stand in a contemplative context. He is a man of intuition
and imagination and not a mere ratiocinator.

14
matrasparsas tu kaunteya
sitoshnaskhaduhkhadah
agamapayino 'nityas
tams titikshasva bharata

Momentary sense contacts on the other hand, 0 Kaunteya
(Arjuna), yielding cold-warmth, joy-pain, alternately
coming and going, are transitory. Do you endure them, 0
Bharata (Arjuna).

15
yam hi na vyathayanty ete
purusham purusharshabha
samaduhkhasukham dhiram
so 'mritatvaya kalpate

That man indeed of firm mind who is unaffected by these, 0
Best of Men (Arjuna), equal-minded in joy as well as pain,
he is destined for immortality.

After stating the position of a man of intuition, Verse 14
speaks of the opposite or counterpart - of reflexes and
automatisms belonging to physiology. Stimulus-response
psychology is involved here. Pleasure and pain, heat and
cold, belong to this order. This is the domain of sheer
necessity which no living being can escape. Arjuna is here
asked not to minimise their importance, as some vague
philosophers might do, or to learn to bear them stoically.
What cannot be cured must be endured.

Such a hardened and brave man, Verse 15 indicates, almost
too hastily it might seem, is fit for "immortality", a term
usually applied only to the highest spiritual goal. But we
should note the reference to "pain" and "pleasure" as being
equalized before one qualifies for this immortality.

The modern stoic, by definition, has come to mean one of mere
brute endurance. But the yogi of the Gita, who is referred to
here, is a man who enjoys as well as suffers with a certain
neutral attitude which cancels one against the other. This
makes all the difference for qualifying for immortality, even
in the fullest connotation of the term in Vedantic usage - as

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one who has come to his full status as a yogi, equanimity
being a positive quality and not mere indifference.

16
na' sato vidyate bhavo
na' bhavo vidyate satah
ubhayor api drishto 'ntas tv
anayos tattvadarsibhih

What is unreal cannot have being and non-being can­not be real;
the conclusion in regard to both these has been known to
philosophers.

In this verse we have a clear enunciation of the methodology
adopted in the Gita. Terms like bhava and abhava (becoming
and non-becoming) are familiar to us in the Nyaya-Vaishesika
system of philosophy, where the term abhava (non-becoming)
is the last of the seven padarthas (categories of cognizable
en­tities) (1). Again, with reference to the word sat
(existence-reality) we should note it is not very different
from the notion of dravya (substance) used in the same system,
for even the mind is there considered as a substance. Substances
in this sense are considered as paramanu (atomic or exceedingly
refined prime matter). The word sat as employed in this verse
has, over and above the substantiality of the Nyaya-Vaishesika
context, some connotation of its own as reality understood in
neutral terms as between existence and non-existence. While the
cancelling-out of existence with non-existence might lead to
shunya or emptiness, the sat of the Vedanta of the Gita is meant
to represent the Absolute. The difference will perhaps become
clear if explained in mathematical terms; if we subtract two
equal quantities, thy answer is zero. But in the case of the
operation in the form of a fraction the result is not a zero
but a one (10 minus 10 = 0; 10/10= 1). The unitive Absolute
is similarly to be understood as different from the mere
nothing­ness which results from a mechanistic form of reasoning.
Unitive reasoning is based upon an intuitive or dialectical
awareness.

In the Gaudapada Karika (IV, 4 et seq.) reference is made
to the very problem implicit in this verse. Gaudapada takes
the

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(1) See "A Primer of Indian Logic" (According to Annambhatta's
Tarkasamgraha) by S. Kuppuswami Sastri (P. Varadachary &
Co.Madras, 1932). dravya-gun-a­karma-dvandva-samanya-vishesa
-samavayabhavah sapta padarthah: v.2, (substance, quality,
action, generality, speciality, inherence and non-becoming
are the seven cate­gories of cognizable entities).
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

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case of two disputants - one a Vaishesika who argues that
there is no anterior cause to empirical reality, while the
other is a Samkhyan who says there is a cause which
regresses ad infinitum. Between these two disputants
nothing is decided about the final nature of reality. Sancerre
in his commentary seems to exploit the situation as an
argument in favour of a positive notion about Brahman (the
Absolute). Whether he legitimately succeeds in establishing
a positive Brahman on the basis of a mere disagreement
between these disputants is questionable. The Gita,
however, scores better than the Karika when it states here
that the disputants are not still disputing but have resolved
their disputes in terms of a finalized doctrine - the anta
(end) in the second line of this verse. This we can easily see
is the anta which is present in the Vedanta (Veda-anta) as it
is to be understood in the Gita.

There can be no question either in regard to the schools of
thought under reference here by the term tattvadarsibhih
(those capable of seeing first principles). The word tattva
(that-ness) is known to us even in the maha-vakyas (great
sayings) such as aum-tat-sat (Aum that is) or tat-tvam-asi_
(That thou art) - apart from its familiarity in the rationalistic
schools anterior to Vedanta, such as the Samkhya. Tattva
comes close to Kant's ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself) and
Spinoza's substantia (underlying Substantiality). This verse
satisfies itself for the present to leave this absolutist concept
open for further elaboration in this chapter, meeting
empirical requirements, while elsewhere other relevant
ways are dealt with.

The words ubhayor api (both taken together) have special
significance which we know as the distinguishing mark of
the methodology proper to dialectical or yogic reasoning,
(see p. 49, Introduction). In the Isha Upanishad (1, 1-14) two
striking examples occur, showing this same double-sided
method of reasoning. Sambhuti (becoming) and vinasha
(destruction or non-becoming) are to be understood
ubhayam saha (both taken together), i.e. not singly. Vidya
(knowledge) and avidya (nescience) are also treated in the
same way. Both pairs of opposites must be treated unitively
to bring out a central notion which pertains to the Absolute.
We know in the West also, philosophers have been referring
to a one - legged argument or a lame excuse to mean
something untenable. The pros and cons have to be taken
together, the obverse and reverse of the same coin; these,
and many other phrases point to the same necessity in valid
thinking. This is the essential

126

distinguishing feature of dialectic or yogic reasoning,
where intuition comes into play, rather than remaining
merely logical in a factual manner. We shall find other
expressions like api cha (also, and) scattered throughout the
Gita text. These are not necessary requirements of syntax, if
the reasoning is merely mechanistic, but they do become
essential only for delicate dialectical purposes. Most
translators treat this distinction in a casual manner, because
they are unconscious of the difference between the two
styles - the merely rational and the dialectical ways of
exposition. In Bhagavan Das' "Introduction to the Gita" he
refers to the profuse use of such expressions as superfluous
and as having no significance (The Bhagavad-Gita, P. 36,
3rd ed., 1940).

The difference is not to be lightly brushed aside in view
of the finalized doctrine which must emerge from the
method employed. Passing through the vicissitudes of the
shunyavada and the vijnanavada (doctrines of emptiness
and subjective idealism) as understood in the Jaina or
Buddhist contexts, theories of reality have been formulated
in the history of post - Buddhistic thought in India. Some
have attained to rationalism, others to idealism within the
philosophies such as the Nyaya-Vaishesika and Samkhya-
Yoga schools. The last vestige of merely academic or
scholastic asymmetry became progressively adjusted and
rounded off. Shunyavada, Kshanika - Vijnanavada and
Mayavada may be said to mark the successive stages of the
perfection of this doctrine, but even in Mayavada vestiges
of duality persist, as between sat and asat (authentic
existence and non-authentic existence) - as a reaction
against the supposed nihilism in Buddhist doctrines. Here in
the Gita, however, we catch up once again with the spirit of
the Upanishads, more ancient than all these schools of
thought, where wisdom again attains its primal sublimity
as a song.

17
avinasi tu tad viddhi
yena sarvam idam
tatam vinasam avyayasya'sya
na kaschit kartum arhati

Know That to be indestructible by which all this
is pervaded. None can bring about the destruction
of This that knows no decrease.

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18
antavanta ime deha
nityasyo 'ktah saririnah
anasino 'prameyasya
tasmad yudhyasya Bharata

These bodies (however) of the everlasting indestructible
and undefinable embodied (One) are spoken of as having
an end. Therefore go on with the battle, 0 Bharata (Arjuna).

These two verses must be taken together. Treated apart,
they lend semblance of support to conflicting doctrines.
In fact many commentators have derived both unethical and
non-spiritual doctrines from expressions contained here,
and especially from the last words of Verse 18, tasmad
yudhyasva bharata (therefore fight, 0 Bharata).

Truisms and absurdities are equally derivable from the
sense of these two verses put together. To derive a
consistent way of life from the words of the Gita requires
its understanding in unitive terms where equivocation or
quibbling becomes impossible. We must try to enter into
what the author Vyasa himself wants to say before hastily
foisting our own favourite doctrines on disjunct sayings
lifted from the total context.

There are two extremities or poles to be distinguished in
these verses. Verse 17 refers to an aspect of the human spirit
corresponding to the purusha (spirit) of the Samkhya
which is altogether above prakriti (phenomena or nature).
This cannot be touched by any activity of man. At the other
extreme there is the pole corresponding to prakriti which is
recognized by Samkhya and even common sense as antavanta
(having an end). These two poles belong unitively to one and
the same atma (Self) - as implied in the phrase nityasya uktah
(said to be belonging to the eternal).

Although not strictly in conformity with Samkhya doctrines
which retain their dual character; yet in the light of more
ancient Vedic tradition, with which the Gita wishes to
maintain unbroken continuity, the expression uktah (said to
be) is fully justified. Monism is well known in the Rig-Veda
(e.g. I, 164: 46: "Him who is the One existent, sages name
variously".

The expression "Therefore fight, 0 Bharata" which
seems to be an order given to Arjuna, deserves our attention
because it is perhaps the basis of the greatest amount of
misunderstanding in connection with the Gita. Some say the
Gita wants

128

everybody to fight for their own interests, national,
religious, etc. Others, like Sankara, though understanding it
as permissive only, think that the advice is legitimate in the
case of a kshatriya (warrior). It is clear that war takes a
very imperative character when we take the particular
instance of Arjuna as an individual caught in those
necessary circumstances so carefully mentioned in great
detail by Vyasa in this and the previous chapter. If, because
of its imperative character as applied to the particular
Arjuna, the converse generalization leading to justification
of violence or war as a guiding principle for the regulation
of human affairs could derive support from the Gita
teaching remains very problematic indeed. It is often
forgotten that the rare quality called true Kshatriya-hood of
the Gita mentioned in xviii, 43 has to tally with its outer
corresponding counterpart called a righteous war in ii, 31,
so that war in that rare and very occasionally remote
contingency becomes the "open door to heaven"
mentioned in ii, 32 . Without a just war a Kshatriya could be
a Don Quixote and the fight itself an absurd rioting by a
plundering rabble.

The balance between the infinite One of Verse 17 and the
finite Many of Verse 19 has to be struck in a manner in
keeping with the perfect symmetry which is maintained here
between the two verses. The first verse refers to the
helplessness of man, and the second verse carries the same
argument further to its simple and natural consequence. The
necessary side of life has its own proper imperatives which
are categorical. We are all caught in necessity and are
obliged to act. Even Socrates had to go to the battlefield
(vide "Symposium", 219-220).

Arjuna is asked to fight so that he may not set in motion
a sequence of disasters, major or minor, personal or
impersonal. His own reputation, as we shall see, is
involved. Krishna is interested, above all, that his friend is
saved from personal regression or regret amounting to a
moral or spiritual death as Arjuna.

Note that only here (and in XI, 34 for other reasons) is
this mandatory form of advice stated so clearly. Elsewhere
it is watered down gradually into expressions such as
"Stand up, 0 Bharata!", "Conquer your enemy, called
desire, 0 Bharata!", "Therefore do not regret", etc. The
mandatory form is fully justified here when we note that, in
conformity to the Samkhya frame of reference, the two poles
of the spirit are kept here as strictly apart as possible within
a truly Vedantic context, retaining the fullest degree of
ambivalence permissible.

129

The Ramanuja school of dualism proves that these two
aspects are admissible within a unitive notion of the
Absolute. The necessary and contingent aspects that belong
to the central notion of the Absolute of this chapter, which
begins by accentuating the duality implied, will be brought
more unitively together in later chapters, and then the
obligatory tone of the instruction to fight will be seen to be
modified according to each chapter as indicated above. The
mandatory character is most apparent in this verse and in
xviii, 59. In the central chapters there is no mandate form
resorted to at all. The mandate here is therefore due to the
structure of the Gita as a whole.

The third-personal usage ("anyone") employed at the
end of Verse 17 is correctly counterbalanced by the word
"Bharata" which applies to the particular person Arjuna
at the end of Verse 18.

The word dehah (bodies) of Verse 18 also refers to the
quantitative or numerical aspect as against sarvam idam
(all this) of Verse 17. "Bodies", therefore, are looked upon
as necessary cannon-fodder, as is inevitable in one form or
another in this world of transitory events. Arjuna is only a
cog in the wheel caught in the scheme of necessity, and the
sooner he realizes this, the better for him. This truth is
repeated in xviii, 61. Unnecessary friction could thus be
avoided. Anyone therefore who construes this reference to
fighting as an injunction as in a smriti (code of laws or
conduct) will be mistaking its purpose, which is only
philosophical. Any vestige or doubt on this score will be
finally abolished when this reference is read with xviii:
"Having reflected, act as you like"

19
ya enam vetti hantaram
yas chai 'nam manyate hatam
ubhau tau na vijanito
na'yam hanti na hanyate

He who thinks This as the killed and he who thinks This as
killed - both these know not. This does not kill; is not killed.

This verse modifies the supposed mandate of Verse 18 by
stating that Arjuna is not killing at all when he is asked
to kill there - thus heightening the paradoxical effect, with
the object of resolving the ambivalence in more unitive
terms.

130

The word ubhau (both together) occurs again here,
underlining the dialectical method of reasoning fully
employed here. Counterparts are brought more closely
together, with all the reciprocal implications. Finally the
seal of unitive thinking is stamped on the whole argument
in the last phrase: "This does not kill, is not killed",
bringing us normally to the wonder referred to in verse 29,
for which the ground is being prepared.

20
na jayate mriyate va kadachin
na 'yam bhutva bhavita va na
ajo nityasavato 'yam purano
na hanyate hanyamane sarire

This is neither born nor does This die, nor having
once come into being, cease to become any more:
Unborn, perpetual, eternal is This Ancient One. It is
not killed on the killing of the body.

As indicated in the metre itself, the words here attain a
new height of sublimity. Except for one hidden phrase, the
words do not require much explanation. Na yam bhutva
bhavita va na bhuyah (once considered existent, it does not
become again so). Reincarnation in the popular sense is
seen to be ruled out. Eternal life seems to be what is meant
here. The Self is never born and never dies. It is pure being
in itself, not subject to any process of evolution, flux or
becoming.

The epithets ajah (unborn) and puranah (ancient) cannot
strictly be reconciled logically, but such apparent
contradictions as we have said, fit into the style of the Gita.

21
veda 'vinasam nityam
ya enam ajam avyayam
katham sa purushah partha
kam ghatayati hanti kam

About him who knows This as the indestructible, the everlasting,
the unborn, never-decreasing one (of) such a person how could
(the questions) ' whose death he causes', 'whom he kills' (arise)
0 Partha (Arjuna)?

This verse finalizes the position of Arjuna as belonging to a
context of wisdom rather than of action - so as to bring the

131

subject into conformity with the major part of the Gita,
which is mainly a dialogue of philosophical import.
Krishna in effect tells Arjuna here that the question of
killing does not obtrude into the situation at all. Arjuna is
considered as a contemplative and not as a warrior any
more. He has no longer any one-sided agency in the matter
of killing. The full purpose or import of such a verse will
become evident if we remember that the Samkhya-Yoga of
this chapter is more than plain Samkhya which is revalued
here. The term purusha (spirit) is purposely employed here
as implying the purusha (spirit) of Samkhya philosophy,
unitively equated to a wise man.

22
vasamsi jirnani yatha vihaya
navani grihnati naro 'parani
tatha sarirani vihaya jirnany
anyani samyati navani dehi

As a man casting off his worn-out garments assumes others
that are new - likewise casting off bodies that are worn-out,
the embodied one takes to others that are new.

Here we have a rather picturesque description, often
quoted in support of reincarnation. The over-simplicity of
the picture is excusable only because of the necessity for
rhapsodic singing as the Gita is primarily meant to be. On
closer examination we find that the popular view of
reincarnation is not directly supported here - although
semblance of such support may be found elsewhere and to
which we shall come in due course. It is not spirit actively
entering into matter; it is rather matter being put aside as it
clings on to spirit by force of necessity again and again. If
we note the complementary aspect of this theory of
supposed reincarnation in xv, 8, we find it is not any
individual soul but Ishvara (the Deity) that reincarnates.
Between the two-faced implications of these two verses (ii,
22 and xv, 8) the case for a veritable theory of
reincarnation, spoken of usually as a doctrine of Hinduism,
has only a very dubious support in the Gita. There are other
verses which seem to suggest and support the usual theory
of reincarnation as popularly held, such as IV, 5, where
Krishna refers to his many past births. Arjuna does not
remember his many births but Krishna does. The
implications of such a difference

132

between Arjuna and Krishna are many. In fact the Gita,
which speaks of an everlasting soul so graphically in this
Verse, ii, 22, seems to contradict itself very definitely in ii,
27, where it says just the converse of the proposition,
namely, "a person who is born is sure to die" etc. Between
everlasting life and an intermittent existence there are
different theories of reincarnation which have all to be
studied individually and fitted into a general scheme to give
a true and sufficiently respectable picture of reincarnation as
it is to be understood in the proper sense of brahmavidya
(the science of the Absolute). Puerile theories must be
abandoned so that we may treat this matter with the respect
it deserves. To state the theory of reincarnation in very
simple terms, as when a person speaks of a crow as his
grandfather, would be to detract from the theory as a very
legitimate way of explaining inequality among created
beings. Childish theories of reincarnation, much in vogue,
are repugnant to the Gita. We do not deny, however, that a
pure picture of how matter and spirit get inter-related, more
or less as implied in the "Enneads" of Plotinus, is still
tenable.

23
nai 'nam chhindanti sastrani
nai 'nam dahati pavakah
na chai 'nam kledayanty apo
na soshayati marutah

Weapons do not cut This, fire does not burn This and water
does not wet This; wind does not dry This:

24
achchhedyo 'yam adahyo yam
akledyo 'soshya eva cha
nityah sarvagatah
sthanur achalo 'yam sanatanaha

Indeed It is uncleavable; It is non-inflammable; It is
unwettable and non-dryable also; everlasting, all-
pervading, stable, immobile; It is eternal.

25
avyakto 'yam achintyo 'yam
avikaryo 'yam uchyate
tasmad evam viditvai 'nam
na 'nusochitum arhasi

Undefined is It, unthinkable is It, as non-subject to
change is It spoken of - therefore, knowing It as
such, there is no reason for you to feel sorry for It.

133

Lest any materialistic or dualistic notion should still
persist in regard to the Self as envisaged here, these verses
are meant to give to it a purer status in keeping with the
unitive Self as the Absolute.

The self transcends materiality or the elements (Verse 23),
becomes eternal (Verse 24), and even beyond thought (Verse
25) - attaining the reality of pure absolutism as in the
Upanishads such as the Mandukya (Verse 7) where the Self
is equated with the chaturtha or turiya (the fourth) state. A
dialectical revaluation of Samkhya duality can be seen to run
through these verses that bring immanent and transcendent
together.

With Verse 25 the attention of Krishna begins to be given
to the immediate problem of Arjuna's grief, which
Krishna wants to counteract. The apparent change of
subject and style of argument in the verses that
follow, dropping down from the sublime to the
ordinary, is quite consistent with the uniform style
adopted in the Gita of referring to contingent and
necessary, transcendent and immanent aspects of
reality side by side. The key to understand the unity
of Krishna's reasoning from Verse 25 onwards, up to
Verse 38 (which forms one natural section) is the
phrase "there is no reason for you to feel regret"
which is many times repeated. The Samkhya style of
reasoning finds its natural counterpart in down-to-
earth commonsense which is therefore not out of
place here when Krishna has to deal with the
actualities of the situation.

26
atha chai 'nam nityajatam
nityam va manyase mritam
tathi 'pi tvam mahabaho
nai 'nam sochitum arhasi

Or again if you should hold This to be constantly
ever-born or as constantly ever-dying, even then 0
Mighty-Armed (Arjuna) you have no reason to
regret it.

Here there is a climbing down by way of concession to
Arjuna's possible incapacity to understand the argument in
all its absolutist implications. Krishna adopts an Alternative

134

next-best line of argument which, however, still conforms
to the methodology proper to Yoga, though conceding more
to the dualism of Samkhya. Though doctrinally accepting
Samkhya duality for the sake of argument, the method
employed conforms to the strict requirements of yogic
dialectics. Herein consists the dialectical revaluation of the
Gita to which we have referred. Note that the principle of
continuity is maintained by the use of the word nitya
(eternal) with the Self. Birth and death are treated as twin
aspects that naturally neutralize themselves in the context of
the eternal. Arjuna is just left unaffected by both equally.

Note the reversion to the second person as against the third
person employed in Verse 17. This is because in Verse 17 a
model rational contemplative was under reference, while in
Verse 26 here it is Arjuna as a historical personage who is
discussed

27
jatasya hi dhruvo mrityur
dhruvam janma mrtasya
tasmad apariharye 'rthe
na tvam sochitum arhasi

In respect of anyone born, death is certain, and certain
is birth likewise for anyone dead; therefore regarding
something inevitable, you have no reason to feel any regret.

That the same double-sided method of reasoning is valid
even in the domain of sheer necessity, is brought out in
this verse. Death and life are the two counterparts here
which, when unitively understood, should leave Arjuna in
the same position as a contemplative.

But, textually examined this verse seems to contradict
all that has been stated in Verses 20 ff earlier,
regarding the eternal nature of the Self. However,
considering the supposition on which the arguments here
are advanced, this contradiction is only apparent and
should be treated together with the previous verse where
there is a saving phrase atha cha (now also, if). The
difference between the Self of Verse 20 and that implied
here is not unlike the two theories of relativity (general and
particular) employed by modern writers. This particular
reference is meant to be fitted without contradiction into
the general theory developed earlier. In both cases it is the
methodology of Yoga that is the common factor.

135

28
avyaktadini bhutani
vyaktamadhyani bharata
avyaktanidhanany eva
tatra ka paridevana

Beings have an unmanifested origin and manifested middle
states, 0 Bharata (Arjuna), and again unmanifested
terminations. Where is room for plaint herein?

A slight deflection from the pure position of ajatavada
(doctrine of non-creation) is again, for purposes of
argument, admitted here. Manifestation, or the middle stage
referred to here, lends tentative reality to what is otherwise
treated as mere appearance and maya in Vedanta. This is a
concession made to reason as employed by all intelligent
man, which is in keeping with the spirit and scope of this
chapter. The vyakta (manifest) of the Samkhya philosophy
proper is not so symmetrically bounded on either side by
the avyakta (unmanifest) as herein postulated. The head
and tail ends of the Samkhya scheme of reality are
represented by purusha (pure spirit) and mulaprakriti (root-
nature, which is synonymous with avyakta, the unmanifest)
respectively. In the event of death or dissolution the three
stages of beginning, middle and end, merge without
differentiation into the new notion of the avyakta
(unmanifest) in the unitive Absolute envisaged here, which
is a numinous factor whose wonder is referred to in the
next verse.

29
ascharyavat pasyati kaschid enam
ascharyavad vadati tathai'va cha 'nya
ascharyavach chai 'nam anyah srinoti
srutva 'py enam veda na chai 'va kaschit

A certain person sees This as a wonder, likewise another
speaks about This as a wonder. Another hears of It even as a
wonder, but even hearing no one understands This at all.

Here the Gita rises once more to the sublimity of a
mystical song, before descending soon after to the
commonplace, like the flute of a Krishna producing
different notes in succession, but having always the lulling
effect of the same music

136

Krishna himself is called Yoga-Isvara (Lord of Yoga) at
the end of the whole work.

"Sees", "speaks" and "hears" are three ways of
appraising the Absolute - and yet, in spite of each, the
Absolute remains a wonder eluding the seeker and not to be
understood in any fixed or static manner as a thing, entity
or intellectual concept. It appears a rather sweeping
statement to say that "nobody understands", but when we
remember that the highest understanding of the Advaita
(non-dualistic doctrine) abolished the duality of subject and
object altogether, this statement is perfectly in keeping with
the final position of Vedanta.

30
dehi nityam avadhyo yam
dehe sarvasya bharata
tasmat sarvani bhutani
na tvam sochitum arhasi

This embodied One within the bodies of all is ever
immune to killing, 0 Bharata (Arjuna). Therefore
in respect of any being you have no reason for regretting.

This verse serves as a punctuation for the section that it
brings to a close. The next section extends to Verse 39.
The reference to sarvani bhutani (all beings) lifts the
discussion one degree higher than the purely human and
historical context. Life values are referred to in the most
general terms. Regret in any relativist sense is ruled out
finally whether it applies to individual life or even life in
general.

31
svadharmam api cha 'vekshya
na vikampitum arhasi
dharmyad dhi yuddhach chhreyo 'nyat
kshatriyasa na vidyate

Further having regard also for the pattern of
behaviour natural to you (svadharma) there is no
reason for vacillation, for there could be nothing
more meritorious than a war that is right for a true
fighter (kshatriya).

Matters relating to the personal life of Arjuna are dealt
with by his friend Krishna by way of consoling him. Even
this

137

new section bears a direct relation to the rest of the
theoretical discussion of this chapter, inasmuch as the values
implied, whether spiritual, ethical or merely those of
personal honour, are all directly derivable from the main
doctrine of the Absolute.

Honour, the loss of which is equated to death in verse 34,
taken in its usual light outside the context of absolutism,
would seem to lend support to such absurdities as when a
student commits suicide when he fails in an examination.
Honour as a value in the absolutist context is equal to
dishonour seen in the same context, and these are meant to
cancel each other out, leaving the contemplative again on
the neutral ground which belongs to the Absolute. When
honour is equated thus with dishonour and dishonour with
death as in Verse 34 below, there is no violation of the
principles of an absolutist way of life that the Gita
consistently upholds.

The much talked-about doctrine of svadharma (conduct
proper to oneself), which is considered by many as one of the
principal doctrinal contributions of the Gita, is referred to for
the first time here. Favourite sociological doctrines of
religious-minded people have seemingly derived support
from this idea. Reserving a fuller discussion of svadharma in
relation to what is called varnashramadharma (familiarly
known as the caste system) when we come to the latter in iv,
13, ix, 32 and xviii, 41, ff. of the Gita, for our present
purposes it is sufficient for us to say that the reference here is
to the position of Arjuna, consistent with his past upbringing
and present position as an actual fighter on the side of the
Pandavas. Svadharma as a general doctrine is to be
distinguished from its particular application to Arjuna in the
given situation. As a general principle it is not far different
from what is known in the "Nichomachean Ethics" of Aristotle
where specificity itself is the basis of virtue. If a tree bears
fruit that is proper to its species it is fulfilling its svadharma,
or unfolding its innate character. The virtue of a good cow
may be said to be the quality and quantity of its milk.
Similarly saltiness is proper to salt. Man's humanity
distinguishes the human kind and conforming to human
nature is the basis of virtue or svadharma for man. Socrates,
as an Athenian, was fulfilling his svadharma when he took up
arms for his city. MacArthur when he bombed Koreans was
fulfilling his svadharma in his own particular context. If he
had refused he would have been just replaced.

138

Here the svadharma of an Arjuna who is referred to as a
kshatriya (warrior) is a parallel case. When we see that
Drona is a brahmin-archer whose svadharma is not in the
battlefield, and even Bhishma is primarily a patriarch rather
than a combatant, the reference to kshatriya conduct here
has to be taken with the latitude that we see is being
permitted for the situation.

It is not to a watertight class called kshatriyas that
reference is made here, but to a warrior type of personality
to which. Arjuna as an individual happens to conform.
Moreover Arjuna is not within the Aryan fold, strictly
speaking. He was related to the dark-skinned
Krishna who was a king of the Vrishnis, some forgotten
and probably heterodox section found south of the
Vindhya mountains. There is no indication elsewhere of the
Aryan origin of the Pandavas ethnologically. The kshatriya-
hood here referred to must therefore pertain merely to a
psycho-physical type and not to a caste, as people easily
tend to understand it.

We have also the glaring case of Krishna himself, who is
not in his svadharma (conduct proper to oneself) as a
charioteer. He is a Guru, a teacher of philosophy who
follows another vocation, not his own, for the time being.
A man is true to his svadharma when he does not
willfully and abruptly break away from his own previous
nature and nurture. Such breaking away in the case of
Arjuna would be if he suddenly desired to become a
mendicant or a samnyasin (renouncer) as hinted at by
himself.

Api cha (also and) occurs again here. This indicates that
the argument is something extra added on to the main
argument, which does not concern itself with svadharma at
all. Such reference is therefore incidental, being merely
meant to console Arjuna.

The word vikampitum, usually interpreted "to tremble", may
be taken to mean more simply "not to swerve" from the path
chalked out for Arjuna by natural circumstances,.
Note in the second line that the svadharma of Arjuna as a
kshatriya has to tally with the legitimate or righteous
character of the war he is asked to wage, if it is to be
conducive to spiritual progress.

Shreyas (better): any warfare is not to be waged by a
kshatriya to promote spiritual progress. Conversely, even a
righteous war has to be waged only by a genuine kshatriya
to produce right results. The reciprocal factors thus
coinciding correctly

139

would alone produce a desirable spiritual effect. This is
almost like Cartesian occasionalism in view of the thin
probability involved here. The chance element
(yadrichchhaya) mentioned in the next verse refers to this
very condition. To derive mechanically the dictum that if a
kshatriya should simply fight he would gain merit is an
absurd notion, although very commonly held.

32
yadrichchhaya cho'papannam
svargadvaram apavritam
sukhinah kshatriyah partha
labhante yuddham idrisam

True warriors (kshatriyas) have reason to be
happy too) 0 Partha (Arjuna) to have the chance of
such a war presenting itself unsought before them
as an open door to heaven.

The idea here is complementary to that of the previous
verse. The door of heaven opens before the warrior who is a
true kshatriya without any exertion or active seeking on his
part. This only underlines the element of occasionalism
which alone favours spiritual progress.

In the actual war that we know in this case in which
Arjuna is involved, there is no absolutely clear line of
righteousness discernible. In fact it is not even a true "war".
It is worse than even a civil war, being a family feud. To
speak of righteous warfare here could have but one
meaning, that it is a war where absolutist spiritual values
are involved. We may suppose that it is righteous because
Arjuna and Krishna are interested in absolutism, while
Drona and Bhishma, who are the best of the Kurus,
represent only one form or another of relativist spirituality.
This is what makes this particular warfare so rare and
happy according to Krishna in this verse. Arjuna does not
go to heaven though there is reference to the gate of heaven
open or him. He was not admitted into a relativistic heaven,
though Duryodhana was, as we read at the end of the
Mahabharata story. Arjuna must have attained to
something higher, in keeping with the value he represented
in the war.

140

33
atha chet tvam imam dharmyam
samgramam na karishyasi
tatah svadharmam kirtim cha
hitad papam avapyasi

If, on the other hand, you will not take to this
battle which conforms to the requirements of
righteousness, then thwarting what is consistent
with your own nature and your good repute you
will become involved in evil.

There is reference on the part of Krishna to papa (sin). This
was exactly what Arjuna feared (i, 45) and for which he
was decried by Krishna.

Now what exact connotation should be given to this word
sin? This question becomes more difficult to answer when
we see that later on the teaching of the Gita is for
transcending both sin and virtue, both bad and good, as we
find even as early as Verse 50 in this same chapter.
The sin referred to here must therefore be to the form of
regret or negative state of diffidence from which Arjuna
himself suffered a moment ago. It is clear at least that sin here
does not allude to any cardinal aspect of the Gita teaching.
Disqualification for full moksha (liberation) and lapsing into
samsara (relativistic life) are referred to often as the worst
disaster, rather than sin, which is a vague term used by
religious people only. Krishna uses Arjuna's expression as
Arjuna himself might use it, for the sake of clarity.
The nature of the sin is suggested in that Arjuna would
contradict his own nature and spoil his reputation, thus
lapsing into regret which describes the state of mind of a
sinner.

The word dharmyam (what accords with one's true nature)
is again stressed for reasons already indicated. In other
words the war must be willed by God if it is to be fought so
as to be free from sin. Omission of such a war is the sin here
as it defeats the will of God, to put it in the usual language
of Christian theology. In this rare case, not killing becomes
sin, rather than killing, which latter all religions hold to be
sinful. It is a special kind of sin of omission and not of
commission. The religious notion of sin is not refuted here.
It remains intact in its own proper context (x, 5). It is not the
subject of discussion here at all. The "kill not" of the
Jewish commandments, of Christianity and Buddhism, do
not suffer therefore by any teaching of the Gita. Gandhian
ahimsa (non-hurting) belonging to Jainism would have
remained

141

equally intact, if he had not sought support to explain it in
the light of an arbitrary understanding of the teaching of the
Gita. (e.g. "Thus the author of the Gita, by extending
meaning of words has taught us to imitate him. Let it be
granted that according to the letter of the Gita it is possible
to say that warfare is consistent with renunciation of fruit.
But after forty years' unremitting endeavour fully to enforce
the teaching of the Gita in my own life I have in all
humility, felt that perfect renunciation is impossible without
perfect observance of ahimsa in every shape and form."
(P. 130, "The Gita According to Gandhi" by Mahadev Desai,
Ahmedabad 1946).

34
akirtim cha 'pi bhutani
kathayishyanti te 'vyayam
sambhavitasya cha 'kirtir
maranad atirichyate

Living beings will also pronounce a never-ending verdict of
calumny on you, and to one used to honour, dishonour is
worse than death.

35
bhayad ranad uparatam
mamsyante tvam maharathah
yesham cha tvam bahumato
bhutva yasyasi laghavam

The great car-generals will look upon you as quitting the
battle from fear and having been honourably looked upon by
them you will be held in derision.

36
avachyavadams cha bahun
vadishyanti tava'hitah
nindantas tava samarthyam
tato duhkhataram nu kim

Those against you will speak of you in unspeakable terms,
scorning your ability; what pain could there be keener than
this?

In these three verses there is reference to very commonplace
values not generally alluded to as religious or even
spiritual. In Verse 34, honour is the value involved.

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How honour is precious to a warrior on the battlefield is
easily understandable and has already been touched upon in
the previous verse. The Samkhya philosophers were heterodox
rationalists who were not specially religious. In this chapter,
where such a school of Samkhya is under reference, the
personal values such as honour, ill-repute and shame, to
which Arjuna is likely to be exposed by backing out of the
battlefield at the eleventh hour, are just those legitimate
and normal values in whose name he could be appealed to.
It is true that in other chapters we find the Gita clearly
teaching a neutral indifference to reputation, shame or
public opinion (xii, 19; xiv, 24, 25 etc). The place given to
shame, reputation and honour in the three separate verses so
prominently here is to be understood as normal to a
complete enumeration of personal values that legitimately
belong to the rationalist realism of the Samkhya School.
Rationalism itself is a form of agnostic attitude where
"here and now" aspects of life are given a large place.
Further, the dishonour or disrepute mentioned in Verse 34
comes from the whole world of created beings, as implied
in the expression bhutani (creatures). Life itself,
philosophically understood in the context of rationalism, is
a constant going forward, a forward flowing flux or
becoming. The "sin" of Verse 33 implies, as we have said,
a regression or set-back in this forward flow of life. The
vital energy in all creatures may be said to make life
always play a forward game. Sulkiness, when one is in the
thick of a game or a battle, amounts to a deliberate act of
obstruction of the normal forward flow of events. Any
backing out of the situation in which Arjuna found himself
would amount to violence towards life itself, understood
in negative philosophical terms, as with the Samkhyas.
Negation has, therefore, no place in the scheme of values of
a rationalist as understood within the scope of this chapter.
As a real soldier on the battlefield Arjuna is here called
upon to recognize the need for safeguarding his own
personal reputation. Soon, however, the tone changes even
in this section of the chapter, as we see in Verse 38 below,
just before the chapter passes on to the orthodox pragmatic
form of Yoga after Verse 39.

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37
hato va prapsyasi svargam
jitva va bhokshyase mahim
tasmad uttishtha kaunteya
yuddhaya kritanischayah

Dying you will attain heaven or winning you will have the
enjoyment of the earth. Therefore arise, 0 Kaunteya
(Arjuna), making up your mind to fight.

38
sukhadukhe same kritva
labhalabhau jayajayau
tato yuddhaya yujyasva
nai 'vam papam avapsyasi

Equalizing both pleasure and pain, both gain and loss,
both victory and defeat, enter wholly into battle. Thus
you will avoid sin.

These two verses are intended to round off the Samkhya
position as revalued in the Gita, before switching over to
buddhi-Yoga (dialectics of pure reason). The dialectical
method is again used. In Verse 37, note that the gain is
double. When Arjuna's reason was clouded by his
emotions, he tried to apply the same dialectical method in
xi, 5, where he imagined two disasters falling on himself.
Here the same dialectics properly applied result in gain
both here and hereafter. When applied to values that were
of earth we had a doubly negative conclusion. Here, heaven
is introduced and doubly positive values emerge.

In the light of the fact that Arjuna did not desire heaven
at all, nor even earthly joys, these words of Krishna should
be taken as giving an example of how to apply dialectical
reason correctly to a given situation and consciously to set
it off against the negative dialectics of Arjuna which is
based on wrong values. Krishna is just teaching him a
method and not asking him to desire heaven or worldly
gains. It would be inconsistent to think that Krishna would
teach Arjuna to desire a relativistic heaven, when Arjuna's
own position has been stated in ii, 8, quite emphatically, in a
manner more in keeping with the superior doctrine of the
Gita. For a Guru to be inferior in outlook to the disciple on
such a subject would be totally untenable even on the basis
of any adhikari-bheda (differences in the rights of persons
to claim higher knowledge) sometimes advanced.
Such an interpretation would be repugnant to the structure
of the Upanishads on which the Gita itself relies.
The verse terminates with the milder admonition to
"stand up" with a firm conviction, rather than "to fight"

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by sheer necessity, as in ii, 18. The keenness of actual
necessity gives place to the need for an intellectual resolve.
It is the need for spiritual reorientation which emerges to
the forefront.

In Verse 38 an example is given where dialectics is
employed quite properly, rid of the dualism still adhering
to the Samkhya way of reasoning. The counterparts are
brought closer together. We find a central place given to
the avoidance of papa (sin) or evil, which obscured
Arjuna's mind much in i, 45. Everything is set and ready
for buddhi-yoga (the dialectics of pure reason) to be
discussed.

The word same (equal) alludes to the chief prerequisite
of yoga, as stated in Verse 48 of this same chapter.

39
esha te 'bhihita samkhye
buddhir yoge tv imam srinu
buddhya yukto yaya partha
karmabandham prahasyasi

What has just been taught is reason according to Samkhya;
but hear now of the same according to Yoga, attaining to
the unity of which reasoning you will be able to throw
off the bondage of works.

That there are two sections in this chapter and that there
is a certain relation between them, we have already
mentioned. The line of demarcation between the two
sections is most explicitly mentioned here, beyond any
question of doubt. There is a buddhi or reasoning which has
been discussed so far. It conforms to the model or pattern of
the Samkhya philosophy; and there is another buddhi which
employs a method and follows a line of thought in keeping
with a more orthodox tradition. The last verse of this
chapter distinguishes the second way or state of thought by
the word brahmi (pertaining to the Absolute). The notion of
brahman (the Absolute) has its affiliations to the Vedas.
Hence it is that we have called the second way as conforming
to a more orthodox tradition.

It has been generally admitted on the part of scholars (e.g.,
Edgerton and Radhakrishnan) that the Samkhya here is not
the same as the Samkhya system known to us from Kapila's
time. The Yoga of the latter half of this chapter does not
conform either to the pattern of Patanjali's Yoga system.

145

In trying to bring out the unity of structure of the whole
chapter Radhakrishnan suggests there is an adaptation here
to "Gita theism "(P 1. the Bhagavad Gita, 1948).

In this chapter, at least, there is nothing which could be
taken to be even approaching theism. The word Ishvara or
Lord does not occur in this chapter. Elsewhere, however,
the word does occur. We should particularly note that in
xviii 61, Krishna does not refer to himself as an Ishvara, but
refer to an Ishvara in the third person, as if outside himself
- Krishna being the absolute and not a deity in the theistic
sense. Then, in iv, 6, Krishna, it is true, does refer to
himself as Ishvara, but here it is among other more or less
important roles that lordship is mentioned incidentally as
the word api (also) indicates. In xv, 8, Ishvara is used as
synonymous with the reincarnating Self and in xv, 17,
Ishvara is unmistakably identified once again with the
Absolute. The word Ishvara should not mislead us into any
idea of theism at all. Ishatva (lordliness) is one of the
siddhis (powers) of a yogi, according to Patanjali, and in
these last two references, Ishvara means human attributes
akin to leadership. Therefore, the meaning of Ishvara as
used in the Gita will be seen to range between the idea of
the Absolute and the mere attribute of a leader. The static
notion of a theistic god like Vishnu is repugnant to the spirit
in which the whole Gita has been conceived. Dr. Lacombe
points out: "Vishnu also, as in Vedic texts, passes from a
subordinate rank to a supreme rank. His identification with
Narayana and with Vasudeva took place at epic periods
posterior to the composition of the Gita" (translated, p. 26,
"L'Absolu Selon le Vedanta", Paris, 1937).

It is clear from xv, 19 that a theistic approach to reality
is ruled out altogether. Krishna represents there the
Purushottama (the Highest of the High) which concept is
different from that of an Ishvara or Lord, since
Purushottama stands for the pure Absolute. Krishna is
against himself being looked upon as having a human form,
as seen in ix, xi. Any semblance of support for the theism
referred to by Radhakrishnan must be derived, if at all, from
Chapter xii where, in Verse 5, the Gita recommends the path
of the manifested as being easier than the pursuit of the
unmanifested, but in the very same chapter amends are made
for this preference on the score of easiness only, by a
concluding verse specially intended for the purpose of
straightening any wrong impression on this matter. We shall

146

give this closer scrutiny in its proper place, but in the
expression dharmyamritam (righteous and everlasting value)
the value implied is far from suggesting any theism. If some
scholars still think that the Gita is a religious book
belonging to a particular form of theism, the only other
semblance of support, perhaps, is Chapter xi, where the
Vishvarupa Darshana (Vision of the Cosmic Form) is
wrongly treated as a theophany, or manifestation of God.
Many western critics, like Prof. R.Otto of Marburg, have
fallen into this error, which is not strange. But for Indians
like Radhakrishnan to make this mistake is perhaps too
much to leave unnoticed. Brahmavidya (the science of the
Absolute) should not be confused with mere religious
theism, and the distinction between the nature of the Vishva-
rupa (cosmic form) and a merely religious worship of
Vishnu should be patent to anyone who scrutinizes xi, 48.
Arjuna himself, not capable of being an absolutist in the full
sense intended in the Gita, pleads for a lesser vision in xi,
46, which perhaps might conform to theism, but Krishna did
not grant that prayer. Instead, he just revealed his ordinary
form as stated in xi, 50. He refused to reveal himself as any
theistic or conventional God of any religious group.
In the concluding part of the Gita (xviii, 66) the final point
to this view that the Gita has no religious message at all, is
found in the words sarvadharman parityajya (abandoning all
religious duties). The Gita is a philosophical work and treats
of Brahmavidya, which has nothing to do with theism or
religion as such.

The second half of Chapter ii has been characterized in ii,
72 as pertaining to brahmi sthitih (the state of the Absolute).
The unity of the two sections in this chapter can be under-
stood when we consider them (1) as Samkhya revalued in the
first half of the chapter and (2) the more rational tradition of
the orthodox schools of thought which prevailed prior to the
Gita, as also similarly revalued in the second half of the
chapter. What gives further unity and justifies the general
title of Samkhya-Yoga (Unitive Reasoning) as applied to
both the sections together, is that both represent revaluations
of rationalism (heterodox and orthodox) dialectically, i.e.,
according to a methodology particular to yoga, "as we shall
see from the definitions and instances of Yoga given in the
verses to follow. No doubt is left about Samkhya and Yoga
being the same, by v, 4-5, so that the title of this chapter
could cover both even in advance already and justify the

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synthetic way of referring to the two aspects of this chapter
together as one "Samkhya-Yoga".

In this particular verse the terms "buddhi (reason)
according to Samkhya" and "buddhi (reason) according to
Yoga " are referred to. The latter is really none other than
buddhi-Yoga (dialectics of pure reason). Buddhi (reason) is a
human value capable of being discussed (I) under heterodox
rationalism known to the Samkhya school revalued as a
Yoga and (2) under orthodox Vedism to which rationalistic
norms could be applied to conform again to the requirements
of a Yoga. Verse ii, 39 demarcates the two sections inclusively
named Samkhya-Yoga as having to do with the Absolute.
Karmabandham (bondage of works) is an evil, one degree
milder than papa (sin) of the previous verse. The remedy for
this bondage suggested here is to be yoked to buddhi (pure
reason) - thus to be "yoked to buddhi "is an interchangeable
term with buddhi-yoga.

The demarcation line between the two sections becomes
very clear by the placing of the word tu (well, now then!).

40
ne 'ha 'bhikramanaso 'sti
pratyavayo na vidyate
svalpam apy asya dharmasya
trayate mahato bhayat

In such (a path) there is no forfeiture of any merit
nor is there involved any demerit by transgression.
Even a little of such a way of life saves one from great
apprehension.

This verse begins the section which is described at the
very end of this chapter by the words brahmi sthitih (the
state of spirit in accordance with the notion of the Absolute).
The word Brahman, we know already, has its origin in the
brahminical or Vedic context and thus refers back to the
orthodox schools of Vedism, as opposed to the heterodox
rationalist schools of the previous half of this chapter.
Naturally, therefore, this verse begins by contrasting the
merely orthodox Vedism with Brahmavidya (the science of
the Absolute) as intended in the Gita.

Relativistic Veda is here contrasted with absolutist
Vedanta. The progressive accumulation of merit, or
regression into demerit, are both irrelevant to spirituality as
it should be

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understood in Vedanta. Although Vedanta has no dharma
so-called, or as absolutism is beyond all dharmas (which belong to the relativist world of action), here we find the reference to dharma is merely for purposes of contrast with relativist duties which are full of injunctions and obligations. It is usual in the same sense to speak sometimes of upanishadsudharmah (dharma as implied in the Upanishads). In the light of the final recommendation to abandon all dharmas (xviii, 66), the non-obligatory character of the dharma here becomes evident. Relativist dharma is open to two dangers which are referred to here.

After building up merit, a slight deflection from, or error of, obligatory conduct could jeopardize the whole progress made, at any stage, at any given moment, not only nullifying all merit, but prospectively and adversely affecting generations still unborn, in the family of the defaulter.

These two dangers are referred to in the terms
abhikramanasah (destruction of what is gradually built up)
and pratyavaya (negation of what should have accrued).
By contrast, absolutist wisdom is safe sailing, as we shall
see from the quotation below from the Mundaka
Upanishad. All Upanishads invariably begin their teaching
of absolutist wisdom by first referring to Vedic or relativist
wisdom often in seemingly laudatory terms, but soon to
damn it with faint praise, pointing out its dangers. This is a
favourite device in Sanskrit and is known as virodhabhasa.
The fear referred to here should also be understood in the
light of the danger in all relativist forms of spiritual
progression which belong to the Vedic context.
The words svalpam api (even a little) suggest those
biblical sayings which also refer to wisdom, such as "a little
leaven leaveneth the whole lump", "the still small voice",
and the pearl of great price,"etc.

The nature of the pratyavaya (negation of what should
have accrued) referred to becomes clear from the following
quotation from the Mundaka Upanishad (1, 2, 3):
"If one's Agnihotra (Vedic burnt offering) sacrifice is
not followed by the sacrifice of the new moon and of the
full moon, by the four-months sacrifice, by the harvest
sacrifice, if it is unattended by guests, or not offered at
all, or without the ceremony to all the gods, or not
according to rule, it destroys his seven worlds."

41
vyavasayatmika buddhir
eke 'ha kurunandana
bahusakha hy anantas cha
buddhayovyavasayinam

Here, 0 Prize of the Kurus (Arjuna), the well-founded
reasoning is unitive but many branched and endless are
the reasonings of them in whom reason is ill-founded.

The basic requirements for buddhi (reasoning) to
function in manner conducive to attain spiritual values is
here referred as being unitive or uniate. Unitive thinking
alone is the proper instrument of contemplation. It
follows certain vyavasthas or rules of arrangement which
properly belong to its method of achieving worthwhile
values in life treated as a whole. One has to desire
spiritual values wholeheartedly according to certain
attitudes proper to the context of wisdom. Such unitive
well-founded reasoning is here referred to as vasayatmika
buddhi (a reason well-founded and regulated and directed
to its object). Such a reasoning establishes a direct bi-
polar relationship with the object of its search. It does not
get lost in endless ramifications. Bi-polarity, once
established, is conducive to further reasoning along the
same lines, culminating in the highest good, in the Self.
This, we shall see, is the basic doctrine of the Gita. This
bi-polar method which consists of resolving duality
implicit in it at every stage is none other than the method
of Yoga, as employed throughout the Gita.
Dialectics, when understood properly in Western
philosophy, would come nearest to this method of Yoga.
In the Introduction and elsewhere, wherever the subject
arises, further clarification of dialectics will be found.

42
yam imam pushpitam vacham
pravadanty avipaschitah
vedavadaratah partha
na'nyad asti 'ti vadinah

43
kanatatmanah svargapara
janma karma phala
pradam kriya visesha bahulam
bhogaisvaryagatim prati

150

44
bhogaisvarya prasaktanam
taya'pahritchetasam
vyavasayatmika buddhih
samadhau na vidhiyate

Such flowery speech as uttered by the foolish
adhering to the doctrine of the Veda negating any
other (transcendental) verity, the self of which is
nothing but desire-made, holding heaven for
highest goal, offering only birth as the result of
works abounding in many special observances
which aim at enjoyment and domination:
in the case of those whose minds are under the
sway of such teachings, who are attached to
enjoyment and domination, a well-founded reason
does not come under the sway of the peace of
contemplation (samadhi).

45
traigunya vishaya veda
nistraigunyo bhava 'rjuna
nirdvandvo nitya sattvastho
niryogakshema atmavan

The Veda treats of matters related to the three
gunas (modalities of nature); you should he free
from these three modalities 0 Arjuna; free from
(relative) pairs of opposites, established ever in
pure being, without any Yoga (discipline) or well-
being (as dual factors), but remain one (unitively)
Self-possessed (atmavan).

46
yavan artha udapane
sarvatah samplutodake
tavan sarveshu vedeshu
brahmanasya vijanatah

There would be as much use for all the Vedas to a
Brahmin of wisdom as there could be for a pool of
water when a full flood prevails all over.

These verses must be taken together. They unequivocally
continue a tirade against Vedism. The relativism of Vedic
spirituality is here condemned as being non-conducive to
the

151

turning of the mind to samadhi (final peace, emancipation,
the highest goal).

The method of reasoning that Vedic-minded people
employ is also here discredited in unmistakable terms. It is
usual however, on the part of apologists in the name of
Hindu orthodoxy to condone or take away the edge from
this forthright condemnation. Here, in Verse 46, the Vedas
are referred to as a useless old well. Condemnation of this
kind is further repeated elsewhere in the Gita. The tree that
the Veda-knower knows is to be ruthlessly cut down in xv,
1-3.

Radhakrishnan, for example, as one such apologist, refers
to the Vedic ritualists as of this verse or "Vedic Aryans "
as he calls them, as "glorious children the youth of humanity
whose life was still fresh and sweet" - yet who "had
also the balanced wisdom of maturity." (The Bhagavad Gita,
p. 117). He does not say however, that they were mistaken
according to the Gita.

In their eagerness to save the Vedas in the name of orthodoxy,
such writers forget that to the extent that relativism
is connived at, the true cause of Vedanta, which is perhaps
a superior heritage for all mankind, suffers by such apologetics.
The rishis (seers or sages) stood for absolutist wisdom first and
foremost, while giving to relativist knowledge all possible credit
due to it. For anyone to try to out-do the rishis themselves in the
name of any Hindu apologetics whatsoever, with which certain
elements of patriotism and nationalism are also likely to be
mixed, would be indirectly a disservice to that very heritage
which Paul Deussen describes as "the fairest flower on the tree
of Indian wisdom."

In Verse 42 the word vedavadaratah (those attached to Vedic
reasoning) is often apologetically translated as referring only
to karma kanda (ritualistic section) of the Vedas, although it
plainly refers here to those who are attached to an argument
which is one-legged, or which is a form of reasoning that is
non-dialectical, and peculiar to the Vedas and not to the
Vedanta.

That such a meaning as we give is intended is clear from
the next qualifying phrase in the same verse: na aniyad asti
iti vadinah (those who contend there is no second side to a
given argument). Vedantic thought conforms to a pattern of
reasoning which has two counterparts, which is exactly
what is known from early Greek times in the West as
dialectical reasoning.

152

That Yoga is essentially the same as dialectical reasoning
the succeeding verses will soon reveal.

In Verse 43 the word svargaparah (those for whom
heaven is the supreme value) would seem at first sight to
contradict what was just said in Verse 49 where the ritualists
are represented as thinking with undue emphasis on one
side of life. Svarga (heaven) brought in here might seem to
compensate for this one-sidedness, but in reality the heaven
of the ritualist is only a form of an "earthly paradise"
where the same pleasures that are understood on earth could
be prolonged. Indra, for example, is steeped in such
pleasures. Such a heaven, non-dialectically conceived, is
repugnant to the teaching of the Gita, although this does not
mean that higher human values properly understood are
excluded. This will be clear from iii, 11, where there is a
reference to a properly contemplative give and take
between man and gods as reciprocal counterparts of the
same situation as revised in Vedanta.

The phrase janma-karma-phala-pradam (yielding fruits of
action through births) can refer to superior or inferior
relativist values, but both the result and the action are
conceived as lying within the relativistic scheme. Further the
"fruit" here is a third factor incompatible with either ends or
means. Therein lies the absurdity of the Vedic way,
confusing the mind of the seeker because of the triangular
situation involved. Bi-polarity of interest, which is a pre-
requisite for yogic reasoning is thus violated. Hence the
ritualistic injunctions become endlessly complicated and
entangled. This is what is suggested in the next phrase: kriya
visesha bahulam (abounding in ritualistic speculations).

In Verse 44, the phrase tayi apahrita-chetasam (faculties
dominated by such factors), refers to what we have
distinguished above as the third intrusive interest,
lopsidedly conceived. For samadhi (final peace) to result, it
is essential that energies should not be dissipated in third
interests which fall outside the scope of spirituality, for
spiritual progress takes place only through a direct bi-polar
relationship.

Of reasoning it is said here na vidhiyate (will not bend).
Reasoning will not bend or submit to progressive
sublimation in terms of higher and higher interests or values
to the extent that the bipolarity is interfered with.
In Verse 45 the relativistic character of the Vedas is further
elaborated. The highest point of perfection envisaged
according

153

to Vedic teaching is a brahmin of sattvic (pure) nature.
Arjuna is called upon to desire something better still, which
is to be got only by a thorough-going Absolutist.
The categoric nature of the injunction to Arjuna to discard
altogether the relativist standpoint is made quite
clear in the phrase nistraigunyo bhava'rjuna (transcend the
three modalities of nature, Arjuna). J ust as crabbed age and
youth cannot live together, so with relativism and
absolutism. To think that karma (action) and jnana
(wisdom) are recommended together here as some lukewarm
apologists tend to think is exactly what Sankara calls the
error of jnana-karma-samuchchhaya (commingling of
wisdom and work) against which he has fought many a
battle in various parts of his bhashyas commentaries).
The revised attitude proper to the outlook of Vedanta is
summed up in the second line of the same verse:
nirdvandvah (not based on pairs of opposites, e.g., pleasure
and pain), nityasattvastho (established in timeless or pure
being). It is true that the word sattva (referring to pure
being) is common to Vedic and Vedantic ways of life, but
the prefix nitya (timeless) lifts it out of the framework of
relativism altogether. It does not refer to the social quality,
holiness or purity of a ritualistic brahmin, who is the highest
product of the Vedic way. To complete the meaning of what
these remarks mean, they should be read with reference to
the brahmin in Verse 46. Finally there is the phrase
niryogakshema (without caring for end, e,g., prosperity and
happiness here, as understood in the Vedic context). Further
implications of Yoga (something to be attained) and kshema
(prosperity) as used here have to be derived from Chapter iv,11
and the connective verses. The dualistic attitude as regards
ends and means is here condemned.

In Verse 46 the central value of the Vedas is compared to
drinking water. The intelligent brahmin values this in the
form of its full-flooded culmination as the Vedanta and has
left off drinking at the Vedic well. The non-intelligent
brahmin still persists in seeing value in what has been
discarded, and because of his relativistic, static or closed
form of spirituality, which the intelligent have long since
transcended, is here held up for ridicule. The absurdity of
Vedic orthodoxy for its own sake is condemned. The reductio
ad absurdum argument,

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(1) For further discussion on ends and means see Chapter
XVIII in "The Word of the Guru" by P. Natarajan (Bangalore,
1952).
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

154

evidently implicit in this verse, is watered down
considerably in many translations, especially by those who
are religious-minded.

In the light of v, 18, we see further that the Gita attaches
no superiority even to a learned and humble brahmin in the
context of the wisdom of the Absolute (brahmavidya)
which is its main concern, although some credit seems to be
allowed for the spirituality of brahminhood in ix, 33 But on
closer examination of that verse, we find that it is only
simple human goodness and not any special holiness as
such that is given a passing recognition. The question is of
loving Vedanta more and the Veda only as much as it
deserves. It is not that we should love the Vedas less but
that we should love Vedanta more. The Gita represents a
full-blooded revaluation of the closed static spirituality of
the Vedas in dynamic and open terms, to use the terminology
of Bergson. No total discredit of the Vedas is intended here,
if it implies no denial of the absolutist way.

47
karmany eva 'dhikras te
ma phaleshu kadachana
ma karma phala hetur bhur
ma te sango 'stv akarmani

Your concern should be with action (as such) alone, not for
any benefits ever. Do not become benefit-motivated; be
not attached to inaction (either).